By Felix de St. Vincent and Brett Favras
Here, Felix de St. Vincent and Brett Favras argue that—contrary the recent claim that Alasdair MacIntyre is “anti-integralist”—MacIntyre’s thought, if not itself integralist, at least points in that direction. Provocative as always, they offer an excellent exposition of MacIntyre’s own thought and respond to certain, perhaps simplistic, readings of his works.
Regardless of where MacIntyre himself is ultimately placed, MacIntyre’s thought has undeniable value for integralist thinkers for two chief reasons. First, although the relation of church and state is historically the defining feature of integralism, no less defining is integralism’s insistence on the primacy of the common good. Today, indeed, the few thinkers who accept any notion of the common good tend to view it as something instrumental and private. Not so Alasdair MacIntyre. Second, MacIntyre correctly rejects the confusion of nature and grace that was so prominent in 20th century Theology. A correct understanding of this distinction is, as Pater Edmund has argued, vital to a proper account of an integralist dyarchy.
To these two may be added a third reason his thought is a useful admonition (or perhaps corrective in some cases) for integralists: MacIntyre warns that we must be careful not to replace one leviathan with another. MacIntyre’s sees that justice exists in multiple coordinate but separate spheres, each with its own proper end. An integralist state that subsumed family and subsidiarity would not be a just order but yet another tyranny. ——The Editors.
The philosophical work of Alasdair MacIntyre is a touchstone for post-liberal political theory, especially in the English-speaking world, and especially for Christians. Most prominently, his work inspires the Benedict Option movement, although he has repudiated this development. There has been less of a concerted effort to link MacIntyre to the revival of Catholic integralism. Nevertheless, some affinities are obvious: MacIntyre is a Thomist, a critic of the liberal separation of politics from concern with a shared conception of human ends.[1]