The Josias Podcast Episode LII: Leo XIII on Freemasonry

Our hosts, Amanda and Fr. Jon Tveit, discuss Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical on Freemasonry, Humanum genus (1884), as well as its historical context and relevance for today.

Bibliography:

Header Image: Constantino Brumidi, The Apotheosis of Washington (1865).

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The Josias Podcast Episode LI: Liberty! Part Deux

Our series on Leo XIII’s social encyclicals continues with Libertas praestantissimum. After some updates, our editor discusses Leo’s distinction between natural and moral liberty, and how this is manifested in his approach to the so-called ‘modern liberties.’

Bibliography

If you have questions or comments, please send them to editors(at)thejosias.com.

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Many thanks to our generous supporters on Patreon, who enable us to pay for podcast hosting. If you have not yet joined them, please do so. You can set up a one-time or recurring donation in any amount. Even $1 a month would be splendid.

The Josias Podcast Episode L: Aeterni Patris

Our hosts, Fr. Jon Tveit and Amanda, are joined by Dr. Daniel Lendman, Assistant Professor of Catholic Theology at Ave Maria University, for a conversation about Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical on the restoration of Christian philosophy, Aeterni Patris (1879).

Bibliography:

Header Image: Andrea da Firenze, The Triumph of St Thomas Aquinas (fresco detail) (c. 1366).

If you have questions or comments, please send them to editors(at)thejosias.com.

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Christianity, ‘Cristendom,’ and Conversion

By Ben Reinhard

Reports of the death of Christendom are, it seems, somewhat exaggerated. Indeed, and contrary to all expectation, Christendom seems to be enjoying a renaissance of sorts in the second quarter of this century: as a term, at least, if not yet as a social and cultural reality. Even this conceptual renaissance, however, seems significant. Only a decade ago, Christendom was a decidedly fringe concept: few knew even the proper pronunciation of the word; fewer still had any interest in discussing its relevance for life in the modern world. Something strange has happened, however, in the past five years. First, in 2020, came Msgr. James Shea’s justly acclaimed From Christendom to Apostolic Mission, arguing that Christians must adopt new evangelistic paradigms in a post-Christendom world. Perhaps prematurely: no sooner had Msgr. Shea announced the end of the age of Christendom than a new, young, and largely online generation rediscovered it. Today, Christendom is apparently everywhere. It is discussed, of course, in books and journals and blogs, engaging the intellects of writers like Paul Kingsnorth, Sebastian Morello, Michael Warren Davis, and Joshua Charles. In some quarters, the concept has escaped from page and screen into the real world; post-liberal Catholics now occupy positions of power from county councils to Washington, D.C. Intellectually engaged Christians no longer ask what Christendom is but whether it can be revived – or, perhaps, if it should be. 

For all that Christendom has become a much-discussed topic in recent years, consensus on these most important questions has proved elusive. From all appearances, the gulf between those who come to praise Christendom and those who hope to bury it is only increasing. These heightened contradictions can be seen with special clarity in the case of Christendom College, a small and fiercely Catholic liberal arts college in Virginia’s Shenandoah Valley. As the educational offspring of Triumph magazine and Brent Bozell’s Christian Commonwealth Institute, the college has been dedicated to the restoration of Christian society since its founding in 1977. Today, the college is thriving, with its magnificent new chapel towering over commuters on I-66 and its dorms filled to capacity as it prepares to celebrate 50 years of “restoring all things in Christ”: a win, it would seem, for the renewal crowd. But the college’s success has drawn the negative attention of the critical camp; most notably, of Mark Massa, S.J., of Boston College. In his Oxford University Press-published monograph Catholic Fundamentalism in America, Massa mocks the college and its leaders for “Dreaming of Christendom in the Blue Ridge Mountains,” accusing them of sectarianism, fundamentalism, and parochialism – and much worse besides. This squabble in Catholic higher education is, alas, merely a concrete representative of the larger conversation. The same debate is repeated, with minimal variation, everywhere the idea is discussed today.

It is unlikely that a broad consensus will emerge any time soon. As those attuned to these discussions know, these disagreements reflect deeply-rooted differences in ecclesiology, anthropology, ethics, and politics. It may nonetheless be possible to take a first step towards clarity by recognizing that linguistics also plays its role in the ongoing confusion; at least part of the problem is semantic. However modern commentators may feel about the eclipse of Christendom – whether they view it as lamentable or desirable, inevitable or reversible – they tend to agree on one thing: they all ascribe to the twentieth-century understanding of the term. Though different writers may offer slightly different formulations, the great majority would agree that the word ‘Christendom’ refers to some form of Christian civilization or culture. As the historian Warren Carroll has it, Christendom is “a Christian society, shaped by Christian principles and truth to the fullest extent man’s fallen nature permits, a society that publicly acknowledges Christ as King.” 

Allowing for Carroll’s favorable spin, this is a wholly acceptable common-use definition. But while Carroll accurately captures how the term has been used in the twentieth- and twenty-first century, his definition does not do justice to the full historical richness of the term. This is to be regretted, as the word Christendom has an illustrious history. It is almost as old as written English itself, and occupies an important place in England’s legal and ecclesiastical history. Massa suggests that this history may illuminate our contemporary discussions. On his account,

“Cristendom” is an Anglo-Saxon term thought to have been invented in the ninth century by a scribe (possibly in the court of King Alfred the Great) translating Paulus Orosius’s History of the Pagans, written in the early fifth century. That busy scribe was seeking a term (non-existent before his efforts) to express the idea of a universal culture in which Christ (and Christ’s Church) held direct sway over every human creature.1

But while Massa is right that is helpful to go back to the Old English roots of the term, he is wrong in almost everything else he says. Orosius did not write a history of the pagans, but against them; the Anglo-Saxon translator was not a mere hassled copyist, but (as scholars have shown) an educated, creative, and humane scholar; though cristendom is attested first in his work, the translator almost certainly did not invent the word (as England had been thoroughly Christianized two centuries before he wrote, it is unlikely that so basic a term had not already entered the lexicon). It is enough to make one wonder what else Massa’s Oxford editor had on his plate when this passage crossed his desk. Even Homer may sometimes nod, but here he seems to have fallen asleep at the wheel.

These errors are mere trifles, however, compared with Massa’s central howler. The translator of the Orosius did not use cristendom “to express the idea of a universal culture in which Christ (and Christ’s Church) held direct sway over every human creature.” In the first place, it is doubtful whether he would have possessed a concept of a universal monoculture and more doubtful still that would have approved it. Had he read his Bede – and he almost certainly had – he would have known that cristendom could and did flourish in diverse national cultures. More seriously still, this is not at all how the translator uses the term cristendom. While the term occurs in various contexts through the Old English Orosius, it most frequently translates Latin terms like tempora Christiana or Christiana religio, occasionally it refers to an individual’s privately held faith (as when a persecutor attempts to make a man abandon his cristendom). For these reasons, Malcolm Godden, the most recent translator of the Orosius into modern English renders cristendom, consistently and simply, as Christianity.

Those familiar with Old English will immediately recognize that this is, in fact, the correct translation. For the rest, a brief and simple digression into Old English morphology is in order. The word cristendom was formed by affixing the adjective cristen (a loan from the Latin Christianus) with the suffix -dom, which is used in Old English to create an abstract noun of state. Nouns so created are on occasion simple calques of pre-existing Latin nouns ending in -tas. Some of these terms are alive and well in modern English (freodom, ‘freedom’ = libertas); some are obsolete (haligdom, *‘holydom’ = sanctitas). Cristendom is of course exactly this sort of word, it represents precisely the Latin Christianitas

This can be seen with perfect clarity in other early Anglo-Saxon witnesses to the term, especially in the works of the great 11th-century Benedictine, lawmaker, and statesman Archbishop Wulfstan. Wulfstan had a special fondness for translating pre-existing Latin texts into Old English. Happily for our purposes, this leaves little doubt as to the precise meaning of his words. As we might expect, his homily Be cristendome is a translation of an original Latin homily De christianitate. If the titles alone were not sufficient to establish meaning, the content of the homily would. Wulfstan begins with a direct appeal to the audience: they must know how to give an account of their cristendom. What follows is a simple instruction on the fundamentals of Christian faith and practice, Creed and Decalogue. No Christian empire here, only basic catechesis.

In its original historical use, then, cristendom means Christianity, no more and no less. However then did the term come to mean, not Christianity simpliciter, but a social order that many modern Christians view with suspicion and even hostility? The answer is found in the Anglo-Saxon age, and indeed in the pages of the first writers to use the word, especially Wulfstan. The Archbishop and his fellow clergy were well aware of the extraverted character of their religion, its evangelistic and social demands, and they knew all too well that their own salvation hinged on their faithfulness to this mission. And so they thundered and excommunicated and coaxed and pleaded, they advised kings and drafted laws and washed the feet of the poor. Above all, they exhorted all men, whatever their state, to do their duty to their cristendom. Laymen were encouraged to hold and keep (healdan) their cristendom and to pursue it in their daily lives, bishops and priests to build it up (aræran) by every means at their disposal. Most telling of all, however, was the king’s duty to simultaneously extend and enlarge (miclian and mærsian) the kingdom and cristendom together. In this statement, cristendom has become conceptually linked with a political unit. Elsewhere, the pairing is made explicit. Kingdom and cristendom, Wulfstan tells us, rise and fall together. In this way the term cristendom thus begins to expand to include geographical and cultural notions as well. When cristendom is directly opposed to hæþendom (both “heathenism” and “the lands where heathenism is practiced”), the semantic expansion is complete. Thus the modern, secondary sense of the word Christendom was born.

Here we see a curious phenomenon. The writers who brought cristendom into English as the word for “Christian religion” are the same ones who extended it to a Christian social-political order, an order they themselves were active in constructing (Patrick Wormald, last generation’s greatest historian of early English law and politics, credits Wulfstan with creating and preserving the English polity that still exists today). If this blending of theology, sociology, and politics is puzzling to us as moderns, it is only because we have attempted to divide what the medievals saw as a unity. In his classic Prayer as a Political Problem, Cardinal Daniélou observed that the Church has “a duty to work at the task of making civilization such that the Christian way of life shall be open to the poor,” that is, the masses. The Anglo-Saxons would have agreed with him.

The semantic shift of cristendom came not because those who used it sought to justify a Christian world-state, nor because they were too muddle-headed to distinguish what belongs to Caesar and what belongs to God, but because they discovered (or sensed) a real relationship between the two meanings of the word. Seeking Christianity, they found Christendom. And if linguistic history is any guide, the Anglo-Saxons were not the only people to have this experience. Such ambiguity is not restricted to the English term cristendom. Thus, when Christianity entered the English language in the high Middle Ages (a loan from Anglo-Norman French) it was used in exactly the same way – as a term for both the Christian religion and the region of the world that practices it – and was used so well into modernity. Variations of Christianity continue to be used this way in modern European languages.

So persistent is this linguistic blending of Christianity and Christendom that we may almost suspect that it is relevant, not merely as a curious fact of historical Christianity, but as a revelation of a fundamental truth of the religion, that Cardinal Daniélou was right when he wrote that “there can be no radical division between civilization and what belongs to the interior being of man.” On the contrary, there is a real and essential connection between Christianity and Christendom, one so powerful that neither thought nor language can keep them neatly separate.

Returning at last to our contemporary Christendom debates, where does this foray into millennium-old linguistics and ecclesiastical history leave us? It seems clear to me that this invites a change in thinking for both the “renewal” and “critique” parties; for now, however, I would be content with a change in definition. To whit, wherever Christian religion is truly practiced, and to the extent that it is practiced, there is Christendom: in any civilization, state, family, or soul. Clarity on this point is essential for successful navigation of the challenges of our age – or any age. To those who live, as most of my readers surely do, in the post-Christian West, it reveals how much work we have to do. True Christianity is not a religion of pure contemplation, tending towards quietism, it is a lively, fighting, and even crusading faith, one that makes demands on the temporal order. Purely private religion, individual perfection, the naked public square – these are not acceptable options for the serious Christian, and never have been. The Church is called, as the philosopher and critic Sebastian Morello so correctly points out, to make disciples of all nations. Though our record in the past century has been admittedly abysmal in this regard, this is no reason to abandon the call.

But this is only one side of the coin. If a robust understanding of Christendom places heavy demands on those living in a secular age, its demands on a structurally Christian society is even greater. It bears repeating: wherever Christian religion is truly practiced, and to the extent that it is practiced, there is Christendom. From the one to whom much is given, much is required. To the publicly Christian society, family, or individual, Christendom is therefore the call to continual conversion, to become more deeply and perfectly what we profess to be. Only thus can we avoid the charges of hypocrisy and pharisaism so often levelled at Christian societies, and only thus can we save our souls. A broad and vague cultural Christianity (as in 1950s America) is not enough to make a society truly part of Christendom, nor is public observance of the liturgical year (as in modern Austria). We reflect that thirteenth-century Europe is, to some modern commentators, the Christian society par excellence. And yet, if Dante is any guide, the nine circles of hell were richly supplied with that century’s sons and daughters.

This is how things must be in a fallen world. As Daniélou pointed out 60 years ago, no merely earthly social order, however perfect, can be fully identified with Christianity as such. The one is by definition natural and temporal, the other is the “divine irruption” of supernatural grace. But it is essential to the Gospel that this irruption happened, and continues to happen, in history, through the Incarnation and the life of the Church. In the course of this history, many Christendoms have been created. Some of these (the Middle East and North Africa in the eighth century, Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth) have ceased to be. Some may yet be restored. The essential mission of the Church in the world, however, remains the same.

This realization should govern the way we proceed. We may, as Msgr. Shea urged, cease to rely on institutional structures and adopt more humble, practical, and flexible evangelistic strategies. I would go so far as to argue that this is among most urgent pastoral concerns of our day. We cannot, however, talk about moving from Christendom to apostolic mission. Considered correctly, these are merely two aspects of the same thing, the attempt to fulfill the Great Commission, even unto the end of the age. 

Ben Reinhard is professor of English and faculty associate of the Veritas Center for Ethics in Public Life at Franciscan University of Steubenville, where he also serves as the director of the Humanities and Catholic Culture Program. He writes and teaches on the Inklings, medieval legend, and the thought of Christopher Dawson. His most recent book, The High Hallow: Tolkien’s Liturgical Imagination, was published in 2025 by Emmaus Road Publishing. He lives in Steubenville, Ohio with his wife and five children.

  1. Mark Massa, S.J., Catholic Fundamentalism in America, 126. ↩︎

The Josias Podcast Episode XLIX: Pope Leo XIII and his Writings

Our hosts, Fr. Jon Tveit and Amanda, are joined by Gideon Lazar for a conversation about Pope Leo XIII, his pontificate, writings, and whether there will be a Leonine revival under our newly elected pontiff, Leo XIV.

Bibliography:

Header Image: Biagio Barzotti, Pope Leo XIII with Cardinals: Rampolla, Parochi, Bonaparte and Sacconi (c. 1890).

If you have questions or comments, please send them to editors(at)thejosias.com.

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The Josias Podcast, Special Episode: Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue (Re-Release)

This week, we at The Josias were saddened by the death of Alasdair MacIntyre, whose contributions to moral and political philosophy cannot be overstated. He was profoundly influential in the intellectual lives of many of us here at The Josias. In his memory, we are re-releasing our September 2018 Podcast episode on his book, After Virtue (1981).

Requiescat in pace.

To view the reading list for this episode, please visit the original podcast episode’s post, here.

The Josias Podcast Episode XLVIII: Ordo Amoris

Our hosts, Fr. Jon Tveit and Amanda, are joined by Pater Edmund and Fr. Joseph Hudson, OSB for a conversation about the role of the ordo amoris in Catholic intellectual tradition.

Fr. Joseph Hudson, a Benedictine priest of Clear Creek Abbey, studied philosophy before entering the cloister in 2008. In 2019 he went to Rome to earn a Licentiate in Sacred Theology at the Angelicum, later teaching at Clear Creek. In 2023, he returned to Rome to pursue a doctorate.

Bibliography:

Header Image: Dirk Jacobsz Vellert, The Vision of St. Bernard (1524)

If you have questions or comments, please send them to editors(at)thejosias.com.

Follow us on Twitter and Facebook.

Many thanks to our generous supporters on Patreon, who enable us to pay for podcast hosting. If you have not yet joined them, please do so. You can set up a one-time or recurring donation in any amount. Even $1 a month would be splendid.

Ordo Amoris: Love Has an Order, Not All Are Loved Equally

Does Christian love require that we love all people equally? Some say yes. They imagine love as a boundless sea, flowing in all directions, touching every shore equally. There is something true about that. God’s love is infinite and there is nothing in creation that is not touched by it. That is perhaps an accurate image of Divine Love as certain pre-Christian thinkers might frame it. But this is not love as it is revealed to us in Sacred Scripture. It is not the way of things from the Judeo-Christian perspective. In addition to this general love, there is also a particular and special love and this love has an order. It follows a path. It is structured and intentional, like a river carving its way through the land.

Continue reading “Ordo Amoris: Love Has an Order, Not All Are Loved Equally”

The Josias Podcast Episode XLVII: Relics

Our hosts, Fr. Jon Tveit and Amanda, are joined by Fr. Justin Cinnante, O.Carm., for a conversation about relics, their power and significance, and the full story of how Fr. Justin came to bless and present President Donald Trump with a relic of the True Cross.

Fr. Justin is a Carmelite priest and serves as the Chaplain at Iona Preparatory High School.

Header Image: Titian, The Vendramin Family Venerating a Relic of the True Cross (1540s)

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Book Review: Invisible Doctrine

George Monbiot and Peter Hutchison, Invisible Doctrine: The Secret History of Neoliberalism (New York: Crown, 2024).

From the advent of the Nixon Coalition of 1968 to the Trump election of 2016, the Republican Party had three key planks in its platform. The first is strong military defense spending, coupled with the claim of being the party of the “patriot” or the “real American.” The second is a social conservativism with policies largely in line with Catholic and Evangelical morality. The last plank is what has been called fiscal conservativism by its friends and neoliberalism by its enemies. In their recent book, Invisible Doctrine: The Secret History of NeoliberalismGuardian columnist George Monbiot and filmmaker Peter Hutchison take aim at this third plank of the contemporary American Republican Party.

Monbiot’s and Hutchison’s premise is that neoliberalism is the dominant Weltanschauung of the 21st century. And while everyone (or nearly everyone) frames their own personal worldview in neoliberal terms, it is, as the title of their book suggests, an invisible power. According to Monbiot and Hutchison, those on the right who call Kamala Harris, Bill Clinton, Barack Obama or any other progressive figure a communist or Marxist are only fooling themselves, for Kamala Harris, Bill Clinton, and Barack Obama are neoliberals. Those who, in turn, call Donald Trump, George W. Bush, or Steve Bannon fascists or Nazis are, in the view of Monbiot and Hutchison, also fooling themselves, for Donald Trump, George W. Bush, and Steve Bannon are neoliberals as well. Neoliberalism, according to the authors, is today economics simply considered. 

Neoliberalism has, in the authors’ view, eroded politics by replacing citizens with consumers. It has granted increasing liberty to the 1% to exploit the 99%, whose free speech and right to organize are curtailed by neoliberal legislators. It is further responsible for the sense of isolation and the rise of mental illness and suicide among Westerners, for neoliberalism allegedly teaches a philosophy of individualism and cutthroat, Hobbesian competition. 

Monbiot’s and Hutchison’s history of neoliberalism has a number of parallels to that of Naomi Klein’s 2007 The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. These authors’ twist is, however, to locate capitalism’s origins in the Portuguese colonization of Madeira. When the Portuguese arrived at the island of Madeira in the 1420s, it was largely uninhabited. As a result, the Portuguese were free to strip the island of its resources (namely lumber) and to utilize the land for farming and livestock. Monbiot and Hutchison see these events as the birth of a pure capitalism in which the previous social ties and moral structure of feudalism were abandoned for an entirely deracinated economic system. This rather reactionary argument is carried through the book to demonstrate that capitalism and neoliberalism have a fundamentally destructive and exploitative character. They feed off resources until exhaustion, alienating and exploiting workers, who are themselves mere resources or tools for the capitalist system. 

Like others before them, Monbiot and Hutchison see John Locke as one of the most important early theorists of capitalism. Locke argued that the world was originally a blank slate and that ownership is achieved through one’s labor on land. This, according to the authors, creates a vision of the world (and even the universe) as merely “standing reserve” or raw material for exploitation and use. No longer are human communities based on ethnic, cultural, and religious ties. No longer are peoples rooted in the land and part of a living history. Now, it is every man or woman for him- or herself in the great race to make money from the exploitation of labor and land. 

One of the book’s strong points is its criticism of certain left-wing movements. Invisible Doctrine takes to task the notion that individual recycling has a profound benefit for the environment. The authors note that the 1970 “Keep America Beautiful” recycling campaign was “pure Astroturf” and was funded largely by corporations that wanted to shift the blame for pollution to consumers. Monbiot and Hutchison further note the irony that the reusable grocery bags meant to reduce plastic consumption are themselves enormous drains on the environment. The authors also, like their conservative rivals, call out left-wing billionaires who chide common people for their waste but themselves consume enormous amounts of energy, making special note of Bill Gates’s travel carbon footprint. 

Like a host of other recent progressive books, Invisible Doctrine proposes saving humanity and the world by rewiring the human person. While neoliberalism (and many on the right) see humans as naturally competitive and aggressive, Invisible Doctrine proposes a renewed vision of humans as naturally social, cooperative, and empathetic. Monbiot and Hutchison also believe that getting a certain number of people to reject neoliberalism will have a viral effect and that people can be converted to the authors’ vision of an internationalist, eco-friendly socialism. 

There are a number of points in the book with which readers of a variety of political stripes would disagree. Monbiot and Hutchison have a special animus against Donald Trump, Jair Bolsonaro, Boris Johnson, and other populist politicians. Whatever legitimate criticisms the authors have of these populists, it is difficult to label them as neoliberals without qualification. In fact, Donald Trump is widely opposed by neoliberals in the Republican Party, and the “never-Trump” movement is largely a movement of neoliberals. Moreover, while Monbiot and Hutchison are right to argue against blaming migrants as the root cause of problems in the West, they, like many progressives, gloss over the importance of ethnic community and culture. The authors’ vision of a global village itself sounds a lot like a communitarian version of the deracinated individualism of neoliberalism. Nonetheless, Invisible Doctrine provides a trenchant critique of the excesses of certain types of capitalism and is worth a read.  

There is a popular scenario that, prior to the stock market/housing crash of 2008 and the more recent calls for populist economics, was common in conservative (especially academic) discourse. In this scenario, a progressive professor or writer flies to a major city on a commercial jet, is picked up at the airport by an (often luxury) automobile, is driven to a (luxury) hotel or conference center that is heated and cooled with tremendous expenditure of energy. After consuming food that was flown in from all over of the world and drinking water and coffee that themselves were transported via a complex logistical process, the aforementioned progressive professor denounces capitalism, (post-) modernity, carbon use, plastics, (neo-) colonialism, and the growing divide between rich and poor around the world. In the back of the conference room, a few neoliberal business professors chuckle to themselves at the irony. 

But the chuckling neoliberal professors are a bit unfair. Margaret Thatcher is still right, “there is no alternative” to neoliberalism. Liberal capitalism (increasingly, a neo-feudal technocracy) is the only game in town. In fact, as Mark Fisher and Slavoj Zizek have noted, it is difficult to imagine anything but capitalism in the 21st century; it is easier to envision the end of the world than the end of capitalism. Barring an apocalyptic catastrophe, the rise of some global fascist or communist military dictatorship, or a literal act of God, neoliberalism will continue to run its course until exhaustion. 


Jesse Russell is an assistant professor of English at Georgia Southwestern State University. He is a senior writer with Voegelin View and writes for a number of publications including The European Conservative, Catholic World Report, and The New Criterion.