Machiavelli’s Secularization of Glory

Ubi est mors victoria tua?
ubi est mors stimulus tuus?
(1 Cor. 15:55)

Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori—“It is sweet and fitting to die for one’s fatherland,” proclaimed the Roman poet Horace.[1] Such was the sentiment shared by Niccolò Machiavelli in his exaltation of the fatherland (patria), expounded especially strongly in his critique of Christian religion, culminating in Discourses on Livy II.2. Machiavelli perceived a corrupted attitude among the citizenry toward their patria and laid blame at the foot of the altar: “For, had they borne in mind that religion permits us to exalt and defend the fatherland, they would have seen that it also wishes us to love and honour it, and to train ourselves to be such that we may defend it.”[2] While castigating the religion of his day as the source of weak and “effeminate”[3] attitudes toward the patria, he also claimed the mantle of Christian morality to argue that it was permissible and, indeed, laudable to defend and fight for the fatherland.[4] On this latter point, Machiavelli could have located vigorous support in the writings of many great minds throughout the history of Christendom. Yet, at the same time, he deliberately avoided doing so, and especially avoided the fact that a robust conception of the sacrifice and the virtue of dying for one’s patria had developed and reentered the social imagination over the course of the Middle Ages. This is likely no accident, as this conception was anything but Machiavelli’s own. To suffer death for one’s patria presupposed fighting for and defending it. Death inherently occupies a space between the temporal and the eternal; it is inescapably eschatological, inextricably bound up with questions of salvation, sacrifice, and martyrdom in Christian theology and imagination. For both Machiavelli and the medieval mind, sacrifice for the fatherland was a means of attaining glory—albeit in radically different ways. 

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The Primacy of the Common Good

For Joel Feil

1 What is Commonly Thought About the Common Good

1.1 Honor and the Common Good

Honor is a concept that is closely related to the common good, especially the political common good. Honor, Aristotle, notes, seems to be the end, the telos, of the political life. In truth however, he goes on to argue, the end of political life is virtue; we seek honor to convince ourselves that we are good, since honor is the recognition that others give to our virtue.[2] We human beings long to contribute to something greater than ourselves, and to have our contribution confirmed by the recognition of others, by honor. Jan Eyre, in Charlotte Brontë’s novel, after turning up destitute at the doorstep of Moor House, ends up as a schoolteacher in a small village. The usefulness of her work as a schoolteacher to the community, and the recognition, the honor, that she receives from the villagers for that contribution, make her feel that she is “sitting in sunshine, calm and sweet” and that her feelings are budding and blooming under its rays.[3] What is true of honor in a small village is even more true in a greater, properly political society that can achieve a greater common good.

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Human Happiness and Virtue

Introduction

The Aristotelian tradition has always maintained that human happiness must consist in a life of virtue. Indeed, Aristotle himself defined happiness as “an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, and if there is more than one virtue, in accordance with the best or most complete.”[i] This definition may be one which is accepted by many, but it remains nonetheless debated and denied. Consider Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy’s notorious statement that “at the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”[ii] In the 25 years since this startling declaration was made, society, especially in the West, has continued to wage war on common moral sense, and advocates for a more or less purely autonomous man. Man can now reimagine himself, and as if by fiat, determine what he is, who he is, and what will make him happy. To the contrary, the purpose of this paper is to lay out clearly and succinctly why the happy life for man must consist in a life of virtue. The necessary connection between happiness and virtue, far from being something known only by the wise, can be known by anyone through a careful reflection on their own lives.

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The Josias Podcast Episode XXXV: Thomistic Mystagogy

Thomistic theology is rarely associated with liturgical prayer. So, in this episode, Urban Hannon turns the conversation toward St Thomas Aquinas’ mystagogy of the Mass—that is, his theological teaching on the meaning and purpose of its various rites.

The handout mentioned in the episode may be found here.

Bibliography

  • St Thomas Aquinas, In IV Sent., d. 8, ex.
  • In IV Sent., d. 12, ex.
  • ST IIIa, Q. 83, a. 4.
  • ST IIIa, Q. 83, a. 5.

Header Image: Detail from ‘Mass of the 5 wounds of Our Lord,’ in the Da Costa Hours, Morgan Library MS M.399 (fol. 36v), c. 1515. Image courtesy of Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, Graz/Austria.

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