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Translated by Timothy Wilson

Dubbed the “Common Doctor” of the Church, St. Thomas Aquinas has constantly been upheld by the Church as a model and exemplar for theologians, both in his method and doctrine. The great work for which he is principally known, the Summa theologiæ, became in the centuries after him a standard textbook for theologians and was the subject of a great many Scholastic commentaries (including that of Cardinal Cajetan, a relevant excerpt of which has been translated on The Josias). The insuperable excellence of the Summa, however, has unfortunately obscured for many the excellence of his early Scriptum super Sententiis, his commentary upon the Liber sententiarum of Peter Lombard, which St. Thomas composed as part of the requirement for obtaining his masters in theology. Lombard’s text was the standard textbook used by theology students in high medieval universities, and hence a large portion of the great medieval works of theology are commentaries upon the Sentences. The Summa of St. Thomas, left unfinished at his death, was soon supplemented, through the labors of his disciples, with material from his Sentences commentary.

The text translated here today is taken from St. Thomas’s commentary on the forty-fourth and final distinction of Book II of the Sentences. Here the Lombard discusses the question of whether the power to sin (potentia peccandi) in man is from God, or rather from ourselves, or the devil; he answers that it is from God, and adduces many authorities to prove such. Then he considers the objection that, since it has just been proved that the devil’s power for evil (potestas mali) comes from God, it would seem that we ought not to resist the devil’s power, since according to the Apostle in Romans 13, he who resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God. But he responds by clarifying that the Apostle speaks there of the secular power, and that it is the command of God that we obey no power in things that are evil.

St. Thomas’s commentary on the text of distinction 44 begins first with a divisio textus, in which he briefly divides into parts the text of the Lombard, followed by the main bulk of his own composition, in which he proposes questions and articles based upon the material in the text before him. Thus his first quæstio, on the potentia peccandi, divided into three articles; then comes his second quæstio, on obedience, which is divided into three articles as well. Finally there is the expositio textus, in which he comments directly upon the words of the Lombard in dist. 44, and which is the very last portion of his commentary on Book II. It is this expositio textus which we offer today.

St. Thomas, In II Sent., dist. 44, q. 2, a. 3, exp. text.

Exposition of the text.

After what has been said, there occurs a question worthy of consideration, etc. The reason for this order is, that a power is known through its act; wherefore it was necessary first to determine regarding the act of sin, before discussing the powerof sinning; although a power is naturally prior to act.

Thomas de Vio, O.P., Cardinal Cajetan (1469-1534) was one of the most important commentators on the Summa theologiæ of St. Thomas, whose teachings he defended against Scotists, Renaissance Humanists, and Protestant Reformers. In the following passage he explicates St. Thomas’s use of the traditional likeness of the subjection of temporal to spiritual power to the subjection of the body to the soul. Translated by Timothy Wilson.

St. Thomas, ST IIaIIæ, q. 60, a. 6, obj. 3 and ad 3:

Obj. 3: Moreover, spiritual power is distinguished from temporal power. But sometimes prelates having spiritual power involve themselves in those matters which pertain to the secular power. Therefore usurped judgment is not unlawful.

[…]

Ad 3: To the third, it should be said that the secular power is subject to the spiritual power as the body to the soul. And thus judgment is not usurped if a spiritual prelate involves himself in temporal matters so far as concerns those matters in which the secular power is subject to the spiritual, or which are granted to the spiritual power by the secular power.

Commentary of Cardinal Cajetan, in IIamIIæ, q. 60, a. 6

Having omitted the fifth article, the matter of which (as regards subjects) has been discussed in the preceding Book; in the sixth article, in the response to the third objection, note that the Author, assuming from the decretal Solitæ benignitatis, de Maiorit. et Obed. that the temporal power is subject to the spiritual as the body to the soul, assigns two modes in which the spiritual power involves itself in temporal things: the first of which belongs to the spiritual power from its nature; while the second belongs to it from another, namely, from the secular power itself.

Now, for evidence of this assumption, know, from the De anima bk. II [415b8-12; St. Th., In libros de anima, lib. II, lect. vii], that the soul acts upon the body according to three kinds of cause: namely, effectively, because it effects the corporeal motions of the animal; formally, because it is its form; and finally, because the body is for the sake of the soul. And it is similar, proportionally speaking, regarding the spiritual power in respect of the secular power: indeed, it is as its form and mover and end. For it is manifest, that the spiritual is formal in respect of the corporeal: and by this, the power administering of spiritual things is formal in respect of the power administering of secular things, which are corporeal. It is also indubitably clear, that corporeal and temporal things are for the sake of spiritual and eternal things, and are ordered to these as an end. And since a higher end corresponds to a higher agent, moving and directing; the consequence is, that the spiritual power, which is concerned with spiritual things as its first object, moves, acts, and directs the secular power and those things which belong to it to the spiritual end. And from this it is clear that the spiritual power, of its very nature, commands the secular power to the spiritual end: for these are the things in which the secular power is subject to the spiritual. The text intends this specification with the words: so far as concerns those matters in which the secular power is subject to the spiritual. The Author observes by this, that the secular power is not wholly subject to the spiritual power. On account of this, in civil matters one ought rather to obey the governor of the city, and in military matters the general of the army, than the bishop, who should not concern himself with these things except in their order to spiritual things, just as with other temporal matters. But if it should happen that something of these temporal things occurs to the detriment of spiritual salvation, the prelate, administering of these things through prohibitions or precepts for the sake of spiritual salvation, does not move the sickle unto another’s crop, but makes use of his own authority: for as regards these things, all secular powers are subject to the spiritual power. And thus, besides the thing assumed, the first mode by which the spiritual power judges of temporal things is clear.

And the second mode, namely, from the concession of the secular power, is quite sufficiently clear in prelates who have both jurisdictions in many places, as gifts from princes.