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Analogy and Predication

By Dr. Joseph G. Trabbic

Analogy in General

We can use the same word in different ways so that its meaning in one case will be completely different from its meaning in another case. If I say “The bow of the Titanic plunged beneath the waves” and “We will not bow to their demands,” the word “bow” in the first sentence does not mean at all what it means in the second sentence. We would say that the relationship between the two meanings of “bow” is equivocal, that is, the meanings have no connection whatsoever. If I say “The volcano is in the middle of the island” and “Every island is surrounded by water,” the word “island” has the very same meaning in each case. We would say that the relationship between the meaning of “island” in the first sentence and its meaning in the second sentence is univocal. But there is yet a third kind of relationship that the meanings of a word can have in different instances of its use. This third kind of relationship is called analogical and St. Thomas Aquinas notes that it stands midway between equivocity and univocity.[1] If I say “This Scotch is good” and “My wife thinks Kristin Lavransdatter is a good book,” the meanings of “good” in these two sentences are partly the same and partly different. In both cases “good” means that the thing in question has met certain expectations (or perhaps that it has achieved a certain perfection with respect to the kind of thing it is). But it should be evident to all that what makes a Scotch good will be different from what makes a novel good. Some people prefer Scotch with a peaty taste but no one would say that peatiness is what we should look for in a novel. So, “good” has an analogous meaning in these sentences. It is not meant in a completely different way in them nor is it meant in exactly the same way.

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Does Fratelli Tutti Change Church Teaching about the Death Penalty?

by Gregory Caridi

Not moments after Pope Francis’ encyclical Fratelli tutti was published, many began pointing to its statements on the death penalty. In particular, Fr. James Martin appears to believe that, with this document, Church teaching has been “definitively” changed on this question. He writes:

Pope Francis’ new encyclical, “Fratelli Tutti,” does something that some Catholics believed could not be done: It ratifies a change in church teaching. In this case, on the death penalty.

There are many things wrong with this statement, particularly canonically, but we should focus on the most fundamental problem: Church teaching cannot be “changed” in the way he and many others regularly imply. The Church is not an authority that creates truth. It does not write down a rule book of what has been made true and what has now been made false. The Church identifies something as true, in a way an historian or a mathematician may do so. In other words, the Pope could not change a moral truth any more than he could change an historical one. The Pope, along with the bishops, certainly have the power above all others to identify truth in this way, but no one has power to make a thing false which was once true. What is true, particularly with this issue, is of course complex, but one can be absolutely certain that whatever is true cannot one day be made false, or vice versa.

The problem with Fr. Martin’s position is not merely that it’s incorrect; it’s that it undermines itself. If the teaching can be “changed” from X to Y, then there is no reason that it couldn’t be changed from Y back to X, turning the Teaching Office of the Church into something like an adversarial political process where sides lobby for their position to win out. This is not only entirely contrary to the basic fundamentals of the Church’s teaching authority, it runs afoul to the entire theme of fraternal love, submission and cooperation that carries throughout the document. The kind of thinking employed here has unfortunately plagued our civil law for generations, and it is truly disheartening to see it be promoted in the ecclesiastical space.

What’s perhaps most unfortunate about Martin’s comments and framing is that Pope Francis expresses his most nuanced approach to the question of the death penalty in this document. He moves beyond the bare question of whether capital punishment is, in principle, permissible as a matter of a moral fact to whether it is adequate in recognizing the fullness of Christ’s love. The Holy Father does not directly engage the long-established tradition that recognizes its legitimacy; he instead moves beyond, appealing to a tradition within the Church which transcends bare moral truth, to love beyond the minimal, especially when it comes to something that so cuts off the other.

This is not a “change” in Church teaching any more than “love thy neighbor” is a “change” from “the Lord’s curse is on the house of the wicked.” Opposing the death penalty is to love despite and beyond any underlying moral truth, which by itself would be inadequate in expressing Christ’s unending outpouring of forgiveness and mercy.

It is unquestionable that Pope Francis, and so the Church, is opposed to capital punishment in both the personal and the political, especially when rooted in vengeance or a desire to derive pleasure from another’s punishment, but the Holy Father does not appear to be writing any sort of philosophical treatise or “definitively” defining some sort of new church teaching. He calls on us instead to dig into why he wants us to oppose the practice and to recognize that the tradition of doing so has always existed in the Church. Any statements about a “change” in Church teaching, on either side, are to miss his point entirely.

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The Josias Podcast, Episode XXVI: Historicism

Historicism seems to be a challenge to an integralist account of politics, because it denies that there is an unchanging truth about the human good accessible to our minds. In this episode the editors talk to Felix de St. Vincent and Brett Favras about Collingwood’s historicism, Leo Strauss’s critique of Collingwood, and Alasdair MacIntyre’s much more positive response to Collingwood and historicism.

Bibliography and Links

R.G. Collingwood, An Autobiography, 1939.

Felix de St. Vincent and Brett Favras, “Integralism, MacIntyre, and Final Ends: Towards a Secular Account of Christian Politics,” The Josias, 2018.

Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, 1966; After Virtue, 1981.

Nathan Pinkoski, “Alasdair MacIntyre and Leo Strauss on the Activity of Philosophy,” Review of Politics, 2020.

Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History, 1953; On Political Philosophy: Responding to the Challenge of Positivism and Historicism, 2018; “Lectures on Plato’s Meno,” 1966.

Music: W.A. Mozart, Die Entführung aus dem Serail, Act 3 “Nie werd’ ich deine Huld verkennen,” Les Arts Florissants under the direction of William Christie.

Header Image: William Hogarth, “The Seraglio.”

If you have questions or comments, please send them to editors(at)thejosias.com.

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St. Thomas on the Two Powers

Translated by Timothy Wilson

Dubbed the “Common Doctor” of the Church, St. Thomas Aquinas has constantly been upheld by the Church as a model and exemplar for theologians, both in his method and doctrine. The great work for which he is principally known, the Summa theologiæ, became in the centuries after him a standard textbook for theologians and was the subject of a great many Scholastic commentaries (including that of Cardinal Cajetan, a relevant excerpt of which has been translated on The Josias). The insuperable excellence of the Summa, however, has unfortunately obscured for many the excellence of his early Scriptum super Sententiis, his commentary upon the Liber sententiarum of Peter Lombard, which St. Thomas composed as part of the requirement for obtaining his masters in theology. Lombard’s text was the standard textbook used by theology students in high medieval universities, and hence a large portion of the great medieval works of theology are commentaries upon the Sentences. The Summa of St. Thomas, left unfinished at his death, was soon supplemented, through the labors of his disciples, with material from his Sentences commentary.

The text translated here today is taken from St. Thomas’s commentary on the forty-fourth and final distinction of Book II of the Sentences. Here the Lombard discusses the question of whether the power to sin (potentia peccandi) in man is from God, or rather from ourselves, or the devil; he answers that it is from God, and adduces many authorities to prove such. Then he considers the objection that, since it has just been proved that the devil’s power for evil (potestas mali) comes from God, it would seem that we ought not to resist the devil’s power, since according to the Apostle in Romans 13, he who resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God. But he responds by clarifying that the Apostle speaks there of the secular power, and that it is the command of God that we obey no power in things that are evil.

St. Thomas’s commentary on the text of distinction 44 begins first with a divisio textus, in which he briefly divides into parts the text of the Lombard, followed by the main bulk of his own composition, in which he proposes questions and articles based upon the material in the text before him. Thus his first quæstio, on the potentia peccandi, divided into three articles; then comes his second quæstio, on obedience, which is divided into three articles as well. Finally there is the expositio textus, in which he comments directly upon the words of the Lombard in dist. 44, and which is the very last portion of his commentary on Book II. It is this expositio textus which we offer today.

St. Thomas, In II Sent., dist. 44, q. 2, a. 3, exp. text.

Exposition of the text.

After what has been said, there occurs a question worthy of consideration, etc. The reason for this order is, that a power is known through its act; wherefore it was necessary first to determine regarding the act of sin, before discussing the powerof sinning; although a power is naturally prior to act.

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The New Natural Law Theory as the Source of Bostock’s Error

by James Berquist

Bostock vs. Clayton: The Arguments of Gorsuch and Alito in Brief

If you have ever wondered what practical significance the understanding or misunderstanding of the natural law presented by the New Natural Law (NNL) theorists might have in public life, look no farther than the strange arguments presented in the majority’s opinion in Bostock vs Clayton.

Neil Gorsuch, a student of John Finnis (a founder and chief proponent of NNL theory), argues the following:

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Molina on Civil and Ecclesiastical Power

The term “integralist” was originally applied to Catholic anti-liberal and anti-modernist movements in the 19th and early 20th centuries— such as Ramón Nocedal’s party in Spain, and the Sodalitium Pianum, based in Rome. One of the main goals of such movements was to defend traditional Catholic political teaching against liberalism. Liberals have ever pretended (even to themselves) to separate politics with concern for the end of human life, hence their demand for the so-called “separation of Church and state.” In practice, however, they have ever ordered politics to the false and individualistic conception of the human good implicit in liberalism itself. Hence integralists were always particularly opposed to the liberal demand for the separation of Church and state. Integralist movements took various contingent positions on indifferent matters, on which Catholics are free to disagree with them. But on the central points of Catholic political teaching they were merely defending the perennial and infallible teaching of the Church.

It is this essence of the integralist programs that we defend at The Josias. What we mean by integralism is merely this: Political action is naturally and inevitably directed towards what we take to be good for human beings, and ought therefore to be directed towards the true human good, which is a common good. But the common good of human life is twofold: a temporal common good proportioned to human nature, and the eternal common good proportioned to the divine nature in which human beings participate by grace. Hence there are two authorities directing human beings towards these two common goods: a temporal authority and a spiritual authority. The former is subordinate to the later, just as the temporal common good is subordinate to the spiritual common good. On account of the danger of human pride, it is necessary that these two kinds of authority be placed in the hands of different persons—temporal authority in lay hands, and spiritual authority in the hands of bishops.

Integralism in this basic sense has always been taught by the greatest theologians of the Church— from St. Augustine to St. Bernard to St. Thomas. Apart from a few regalist special pleaders it was universally held by the scholastic theologians. In later scholasticism it was held not only by Thomists such as Cajetan, but also by opponents of Thomism. This is shown by the following translation of a passage from the De iustitia et iure of Luis de Molina, S.J. (1535-1600). Molina was the great opponent of Thomists in the controversies on grace and predestination. “I am convinced,” wrote Charles De Koninck, “that in philosophy the most extreme limits of opposition have been reached by Thomism and Molinism.” And yet, so basic to Catholic tradition is the integralist thesis that on this even Thomists and Molinists agree. — The Editors

Translated by Timothy Wilson

Luis de Molina, S.J.
De iustitia et iure, tract. II, disp. xxi
What power is, and regarding the civil and ecclesiastical power

Having explained dominion in general, in order that we might descend to the parts subject to it, it is necessary that we begin from the dominion of jurisdiction—as much because it is more noble, as because knowledge of it conduces to a better understanding of the titles of the dominion of property. It is also the case, that explicating it is a less involved task than that of explaining the dominion of property. But because the dominion of jurisdiction is a certain kind of power, we shall have to begin from the explication of power.

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Vital Error: Energy, Personalism, Pluralism, and the Triumph of the Will

by John Rao

Nineteenth and early twentieth century Catholicism was rich in militant initiatives pursuing global evangelization outside the older borders of Christendom as well as spiritual and socio-political revivification of the troubled lands within them. These initiatives were stimulated by a general movement of Catholic revival vigorously opposing an Enlightenment-inspired secularization of European and American lands that had already begun before 1789, and which was intensified and spread still further due to the violence and warmongering of the French Revolution.

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Cajetan on the soul-body model of the relation of spiritual and temporal authority

Thomas de Vio, O.P., Cardinal Cajetan (1469-1534) was one of the most important commentators on the Summa theologiæ of St. Thomas, whose teachings he defended against Scotists, Renaissance Humanists, and Protestant Reformers. In the following passage he explicates St. Thomas’s use of the traditional likeness of the subjection of temporal to spiritual power to the subjection of the body to the soul. Translated by Timothy Wilson.

St. Thomas, ST IIaIIæ, q. 60, a. 6, obj. 3 and ad 3:

Obj. 3: Moreover, spiritual power is distinguished from temporal power. But sometimes prelates having spiritual power involve themselves in those matters which pertain to the secular power. Therefore usurped judgment is not unlawful.

[…]

Ad 3: To the third, it should be said that the secular power is subject to the spiritual power as the body to the soul. And thus judgment is not usurped if a spiritual prelate involves himself in temporal matters so far as concerns those matters in which the secular power is subject to the spiritual, or which are granted to the spiritual power by the secular power.

Commentary of Cardinal Cajetan, in IIamIIæ, q. 60, a. 6

Having omitted the fifth article, the matter of which (as regards subjects) has been discussed in the preceding Book; in the sixth article, in the response to the third objection, note that the Author, assuming from the decretal Solitæ benignitatis, de Maiorit. et Obed. that the temporal power is subject to the spiritual as the body to the soul, assigns two modes in which the spiritual power involves itself in temporal things: the first of which belongs to the spiritual power from its nature; while the second belongs to it from another, namely, from the secular power itself.

Now, for evidence of this assumption, know, from the De anima bk. II [415b8-12; St. Th., In libros de anima, lib. II, lect. vii], that the soul acts upon the body according to three kinds of cause: namely, effectively, because it effects the corporeal motions of the animal; formally, because it is its form; and finally, because the body is for the sake of the soul. And it is similar, proportionally speaking, regarding the spiritual power in respect of the secular power: indeed, it is as its form and mover and end. For it is manifest, that the spiritual is formal in respect of the corporeal: and by this, the power administering of spiritual things is formal in respect of the power administering of secular things, which are corporeal. It is also indubitably clear, that corporeal and temporal things are for the sake of spiritual and eternal things, and are ordered to these as an end. And since a higher end corresponds to a higher agent, moving and directing; the consequence is, that the spiritual power, which is concerned with spiritual things as its first object, moves, acts, and directs the secular power and those things which belong to it to the spiritual end. And from this it is clear that the spiritual power, of its very nature, commands the secular power to the spiritual end: for these are the things in which the secular power is subject to the spiritual. The text intends this specification with the words: so far as concerns those matters in which the secular power is subject to the spiritual. The Author observes by this, that the secular power is not wholly subject to the spiritual power. On account of this, in civil matters one ought rather to obey the governor of the city, and in military matters the general of the army, than the bishop, who should not concern himself with these things except in their order to spiritual things, just as with other temporal matters. But if it should happen that something of these temporal things occurs to the detriment of spiritual salvation, the prelate, administering of these things through prohibitions or precepts for the sake of spiritual salvation, does not move the sickle unto another’s crop, but makes use of his own authority: for as regards these things, all secular powers are subject to the spiritual power. And thus, besides the thing assumed, the first mode by which the spiritual power judges of temporal things is clear.

And the second mode, namely, from the concession of the secular power, is quite sufficiently clear in prelates who have both jurisdictions in many places, as gifts from princes.

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The Josias Podcast, Episode XXV: Questions & Answers

Our new technical editor, Chris, moderates a discussion with the editors of questions raised by our listeners.

Nota bene: In the discussion of distributism at the 1:10 mark when Pater Edmund said “that’s what integralism is all about” he meant to say “thats what distributism is all about.” A slip of the tongue.

Bibliography and Links

Music: W.A. Mozart, Serenade 13 in G Major, KV 525, “Eine kleine Nachtmusik,” II. Romanze. Performed by the Camerata Salzburg under the direction of Sándor Végh.

Header Image: “Hans Christian Andersen,” by Kirill Chelushkin.

If you have questions or comments, please send them to editors(at)thejosias.com.

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