God’s Knowledge of Future Contingents: A Response to Alasdair MacIntyre

Alasdair MacIntyre—one of greatest Catholic thinkers of his generation, and one of the most formative influences on my own intellectual development—has unfortunately capped his career by denying divine omniscience. At this weekend’s fall conference for the de Nicola Center for Ethics and Culture at the University of Notre Dame, MacIntyre delivered a keynote lecture entitled “The Apparent Oddness of the Universe: How to Account for It?” In this lecture, he argues that the Catholic tradition has been excessive in its praise for our All-Knowing God. For when it comes to future contingents—or at least the kind of creative and unpredictable future contingents that MacIntyre calls “singularities”—MacIntyre claims that God cannot know them any more than you or I can. “Until [a free created] agent finally makes her or his decision,” MacIntyre explains,

her or his future action is undetermined. There is no fact of the matter about what she or he is going to decide or to do, nothing to make any statement about, true or false. Not only does she or he not know what she or he is going to do, no one else can be said to know this either, including God. . . . So, even if an omniscient God does exist, there have been and will be numerous occasions on which he cannot be said to know what will be done or happen, until it is done or happens.

I think MacIntyre is horribly mistaken. In this essay, I will proceed in three parts: First, I will explain the orthodox tradition concerning God’s knowledge of future contingents, proceeding through Aristotle and St. Boethius and St. Thomas Aquinas. Second, I will say something about where Duns Scotus and William of Ockham fit into all of this, two thinkers whose accounts I do not accept, but who nevertheless agree with the conclusion of the orthodox tradition that God knows all things—including future contingents. Third, I will critique another modern Catholic philosopher who denied God’s omniscience in this regard, namely Peter Geach, whom MacIntyre cited in his replies to the objections in the Q&A, to justify his own imposition of limits on God’s knowledge.

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