The Josias Podcast Episode LII: Leo XIII on Freemasonry

Our hosts, Amanda and Fr. Jon Tveit, discuss Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical on Freemasonry, Humanum genus (1884), as well as its historical context and relevance for today.

Bibliography:

Header Image: Constantino Brumidi, The Apotheosis of Washington (1865).

If you have questions or comments, please send them to editors(at)thejosias.com.

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The Josias Podcast Episode LI: Liberty! Part Deux

Our series on Leo XIII’s social encyclicals continues with Libertas praestantissimum. After some updates, our editor discusses Leo’s distinction between natural and moral liberty, and how this is manifested in his approach to the so-called ‘modern liberties.’

Bibliography

If you have questions or comments, please send them to editors(at)thejosias.com.

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Many thanks to our generous supporters on Patreon, who enable us to pay for podcast hosting. If you have not yet joined them, please do so. You can set up a one-time or recurring donation in any amount. Even $1 a month would be splendid.

The Josias Podcast Episode L: Aeterni Patris

Our hosts, Fr. Jon Tveit and Amanda, are joined by Dr. Daniel Lendman, Assistant Professor of Catholic Theology at Ave Maria University, for a conversation about Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical on the restoration of Christian philosophy, Aeterni Patris (1879).

Bibliography:

Header Image: Andrea da Firenze, The Triumph of St Thomas Aquinas (fresco detail) (c. 1366).

If you have questions or comments, please send them to editors(at)thejosias.com.

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Many thanks to our generous supporters on Patreon, who enable us to pay for podcast hosting. If you have not yet joined them, please do so. You can set up a one-time or recurring donation in any amount. Even $1 a month would be splendid.

Christianity, ‘Cristendom,’ and Conversion

By Ben Reinhard

Reports of the death of Christendom are, it seems, somewhat exaggerated. Indeed, and contrary to all expectation, Christendom seems to be enjoying a renaissance of sorts in the second quarter of this century: as a term, at least, if not yet as a social and cultural reality. Even this conceptual renaissance, however, seems significant. Only a decade ago, Christendom was a decidedly fringe concept: few knew even the proper pronunciation of the word; fewer still had any interest in discussing its relevance for life in the modern world. Something strange has happened, however, in the past five years. First, in 2020, came Msgr. James Shea’s justly acclaimed From Christendom to Apostolic Mission, arguing that Christians must adopt new evangelistic paradigms in a post-Christendom world. Perhaps prematurely: no sooner had Msgr. Shea announced the end of the age of Christendom than a new, young, and largely online generation rediscovered it. Today, Christendom is apparently everywhere. It is discussed, of course, in books and journals and blogs, engaging the intellects of writers like Paul Kingsnorth, Sebastian Morello, Michael Warren Davis, and Joshua Charles. In some quarters, the concept has escaped from page and screen into the real world; post-liberal Catholics now occupy positions of power from county councils to Washington, D.C. Intellectually engaged Christians no longer ask what Christendom is but whether it can be revived – or, perhaps, if it should be. 

For all that Christendom has become a much-discussed topic in recent years, consensus on these most important questions has proved elusive. From all appearances, the gulf between those who come to praise Christendom and those who hope to bury it is only increasing. These heightened contradictions can be seen with special clarity in the case of Christendom College, a small and fiercely Catholic liberal arts college in Virginia’s Shenandoah Valley. As the educational offspring of Triumph magazine and Brent Bozell’s Christian Commonwealth Institute, the college has been dedicated to the restoration of Christian society since its founding in 1977. Today, the college is thriving, with its magnificent new chapel towering over commuters on I-66 and its dorms filled to capacity as it prepares to celebrate 50 years of “restoring all things in Christ”: a win, it would seem, for the renewal crowd. But the college’s success has drawn the negative attention of the critical camp; most notably, of Mark Massa, S.J., of Boston College. In his Oxford University Press-published monograph Catholic Fundamentalism in America, Massa mocks the college and its leaders for “Dreaming of Christendom in the Blue Ridge Mountains,” accusing them of sectarianism, fundamentalism, and parochialism – and much worse besides. This squabble in Catholic higher education is, alas, merely a concrete representative of the larger conversation. The same debate is repeated, with minimal variation, everywhere the idea is discussed today.

It is unlikely that a broad consensus will emerge any time soon. As those attuned to these discussions know, these disagreements reflect deeply-rooted differences in ecclesiology, anthropology, ethics, and politics. It may nonetheless be possible to take a first step towards clarity by recognizing that linguistics also plays its role in the ongoing confusion; at least part of the problem is semantic. However modern commentators may feel about the eclipse of Christendom – whether they view it as lamentable or desirable, inevitable or reversible – they tend to agree on one thing: they all ascribe to the twentieth-century understanding of the term. Though different writers may offer slightly different formulations, the great majority would agree that the word ‘Christendom’ refers to some form of Christian civilization or culture. As the historian Warren Carroll has it, Christendom is “a Christian society, shaped by Christian principles and truth to the fullest extent man’s fallen nature permits, a society that publicly acknowledges Christ as King.” 

Allowing for Carroll’s favorable spin, this is a wholly acceptable common-use definition. But while Carroll accurately captures how the term has been used in the twentieth- and twenty-first century, his definition does not do justice to the full historical richness of the term. This is to be regretted, as the word Christendom has an illustrious history. It is almost as old as written English itself, and occupies an important place in England’s legal and ecclesiastical history. Massa suggests that this history may illuminate our contemporary discussions. On his account,

“Cristendom” is an Anglo-Saxon term thought to have been invented in the ninth century by a scribe (possibly in the court of King Alfred the Great) translating Paulus Orosius’s History of the Pagans, written in the early fifth century. That busy scribe was seeking a term (non-existent before his efforts) to express the idea of a universal culture in which Christ (and Christ’s Church) held direct sway over every human creature.1

But while Massa is right that is helpful to go back to the Old English roots of the term, he is wrong in almost everything else he says. Orosius did not write a history of the pagans, but against them; the Anglo-Saxon translator was not a mere hassled copyist, but (as scholars have shown) an educated, creative, and humane scholar; though cristendom is attested first in his work, the translator almost certainly did not invent the word (as England had been thoroughly Christianized two centuries before he wrote, it is unlikely that so basic a term had not already entered the lexicon). It is enough to make one wonder what else Massa’s Oxford editor had on his plate when this passage crossed his desk. Even Homer may sometimes nod, but here he seems to have fallen asleep at the wheel.

These errors are mere trifles, however, compared with Massa’s central howler. The translator of the Orosius did not use cristendom “to express the idea of a universal culture in which Christ (and Christ’s Church) held direct sway over every human creature.” In the first place, it is doubtful whether he would have possessed a concept of a universal monoculture and more doubtful still that would have approved it. Had he read his Bede – and he almost certainly had – he would have known that cristendom could and did flourish in diverse national cultures. More seriously still, this is not at all how the translator uses the term cristendom. While the term occurs in various contexts through the Old English Orosius, it most frequently translates Latin terms like tempora Christiana or Christiana religio, occasionally it refers to an individual’s privately held faith (as when a persecutor attempts to make a man abandon his cristendom). For these reasons, Malcolm Godden, the most recent translator of the Orosius into modern English renders cristendom, consistently and simply, as Christianity.

Those familiar with Old English will immediately recognize that this is, in fact, the correct translation. For the rest, a brief and simple digression into Old English morphology is in order. The word cristendom was formed by affixing the adjective cristen (a loan from the Latin Christianus) with the suffix -dom, which is used in Old English to create an abstract noun of state. Nouns so created are on occasion simple calques of pre-existing Latin nouns ending in -tas. Some of these terms are alive and well in modern English (freodom, ‘freedom’ = libertas); some are obsolete (haligdom, *‘holydom’ = sanctitas). Cristendom is of course exactly this sort of word, it represents precisely the Latin Christianitas

This can be seen with perfect clarity in other early Anglo-Saxon witnesses to the term, especially in the works of the great 11th-century Benedictine, lawmaker, and statesman Archbishop Wulfstan. Wulfstan had a special fondness for translating pre-existing Latin texts into Old English. Happily for our purposes, this leaves little doubt as to the precise meaning of his words. As we might expect, his homily Be cristendome is a translation of an original Latin homily De christianitate. If the titles alone were not sufficient to establish meaning, the content of the homily would. Wulfstan begins with a direct appeal to the audience: they must know how to give an account of their cristendom. What follows is a simple instruction on the fundamentals of Christian faith and practice, Creed and Decalogue. No Christian empire here, only basic catechesis.

In its original historical use, then, cristendom means Christianity, no more and no less. However then did the term come to mean, not Christianity simpliciter, but a social order that many modern Christians view with suspicion and even hostility? The answer is found in the Anglo-Saxon age, and indeed in the pages of the first writers to use the word, especially Wulfstan. The Archbishop and his fellow clergy were well aware of the extraverted character of their religion, its evangelistic and social demands, and they knew all too well that their own salvation hinged on their faithfulness to this mission. And so they thundered and excommunicated and coaxed and pleaded, they advised kings and drafted laws and washed the feet of the poor. Above all, they exhorted all men, whatever their state, to do their duty to their cristendom. Laymen were encouraged to hold and keep (healdan) their cristendom and to pursue it in their daily lives, bishops and priests to build it up (aræran) by every means at their disposal. Most telling of all, however, was the king’s duty to simultaneously extend and enlarge (miclian and mærsian) the kingdom and cristendom together. In this statement, cristendom has become conceptually linked with a political unit. Elsewhere, the pairing is made explicit. Kingdom and cristendom, Wulfstan tells us, rise and fall together. In this way the term cristendom thus begins to expand to include geographical and cultural notions as well. When cristendom is directly opposed to hæþendom (both “heathenism” and “the lands where heathenism is practiced”), the semantic expansion is complete. Thus the modern, secondary sense of the word Christendom was born.

Here we see a curious phenomenon. The writers who brought cristendom into English as the word for “Christian religion” are the same ones who extended it to a Christian social-political order, an order they themselves were active in constructing (Patrick Wormald, last generation’s greatest historian of early English law and politics, credits Wulfstan with creating and preserving the English polity that still exists today). If this blending of theology, sociology, and politics is puzzling to us as moderns, it is only because we have attempted to divide what the medievals saw as a unity. In his classic Prayer as a Political Problem, Cardinal Daniélou observed that the Church has “a duty to work at the task of making civilization such that the Christian way of life shall be open to the poor,” that is, the masses. The Anglo-Saxons would have agreed with him.

The semantic shift of cristendom came not because those who used it sought to justify a Christian world-state, nor because they were too muddle-headed to distinguish what belongs to Caesar and what belongs to God, but because they discovered (or sensed) a real relationship between the two meanings of the word. Seeking Christianity, they found Christendom. And if linguistic history is any guide, the Anglo-Saxons were not the only people to have this experience. Such ambiguity is not restricted to the English term cristendom. Thus, when Christianity entered the English language in the high Middle Ages (a loan from Anglo-Norman French) it was used in exactly the same way – as a term for both the Christian religion and the region of the world that practices it – and was used so well into modernity. Variations of Christianity continue to be used this way in modern European languages.

So persistent is this linguistic blending of Christianity and Christendom that we may almost suspect that it is relevant, not merely as a curious fact of historical Christianity, but as a revelation of a fundamental truth of the religion, that Cardinal Daniélou was right when he wrote that “there can be no radical division between civilization and what belongs to the interior being of man.” On the contrary, there is a real and essential connection between Christianity and Christendom, one so powerful that neither thought nor language can keep them neatly separate.

Returning at last to our contemporary Christendom debates, where does this foray into millennium-old linguistics and ecclesiastical history leave us? It seems clear to me that this invites a change in thinking for both the “renewal” and “critique” parties; for now, however, I would be content with a change in definition. To whit, wherever Christian religion is truly practiced, and to the extent that it is practiced, there is Christendom: in any civilization, state, family, or soul. Clarity on this point is essential for successful navigation of the challenges of our age – or any age. To those who live, as most of my readers surely do, in the post-Christian West, it reveals how much work we have to do. True Christianity is not a religion of pure contemplation, tending towards quietism, it is a lively, fighting, and even crusading faith, one that makes demands on the temporal order. Purely private religion, individual perfection, the naked public square – these are not acceptable options for the serious Christian, and never have been. The Church is called, as the philosopher and critic Sebastian Morello so correctly points out, to make disciples of all nations. Though our record in the past century has been admittedly abysmal in this regard, this is no reason to abandon the call.

But this is only one side of the coin. If a robust understanding of Christendom places heavy demands on those living in a secular age, its demands on a structurally Christian society is even greater. It bears repeating: wherever Christian religion is truly practiced, and to the extent that it is practiced, there is Christendom. From the one to whom much is given, much is required. To the publicly Christian society, family, or individual, Christendom is therefore the call to continual conversion, to become more deeply and perfectly what we profess to be. Only thus can we avoid the charges of hypocrisy and pharisaism so often levelled at Christian societies, and only thus can we save our souls. A broad and vague cultural Christianity (as in 1950s America) is not enough to make a society truly part of Christendom, nor is public observance of the liturgical year (as in modern Austria). We reflect that thirteenth-century Europe is, to some modern commentators, the Christian society par excellence. And yet, if Dante is any guide, the nine circles of hell were richly supplied with that century’s sons and daughters.

This is how things must be in a fallen world. As Daniélou pointed out 60 years ago, no merely earthly social order, however perfect, can be fully identified with Christianity as such. The one is by definition natural and temporal, the other is the “divine irruption” of supernatural grace. But it is essential to the Gospel that this irruption happened, and continues to happen, in history, through the Incarnation and the life of the Church. In the course of this history, many Christendoms have been created. Some of these (the Middle East and North Africa in the eighth century, Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth) have ceased to be. Some may yet be restored. The essential mission of the Church in the world, however, remains the same.

This realization should govern the way we proceed. We may, as Msgr. Shea urged, cease to rely on institutional structures and adopt more humble, practical, and flexible evangelistic strategies. I would go so far as to argue that this is among most urgent pastoral concerns of our day. We cannot, however, talk about moving from Christendom to apostolic mission. Considered correctly, these are merely two aspects of the same thing, the attempt to fulfill the Great Commission, even unto the end of the age. 

Ben Reinhard is professor of English and faculty associate of the Veritas Center for Ethics in Public Life at Franciscan University of Steubenville, where he also serves as the director of the Humanities and Catholic Culture Program. He writes and teaches on the Inklings, medieval legend, and the thought of Christopher Dawson. His most recent book, The High Hallow: Tolkien’s Liturgical Imagination, was published in 2025 by Emmaus Road Publishing. He lives in Steubenville, Ohio with his wife and five children.

  1. Mark Massa, S.J., Catholic Fundamentalism in America, 126. ↩︎

The Josias Podcast Episode XLIX: Pope Leo XIII and his Writings

Our hosts, Fr. Jon Tveit and Amanda, are joined by Gideon Lazar for a conversation about Pope Leo XIII, his pontificate, writings, and whether there will be a Leonine revival under our newly elected pontiff, Leo XIV.

Bibliography:

Header Image: Biagio Barzotti, Pope Leo XIII with Cardinals: Rampolla, Parochi, Bonaparte and Sacconi (c. 1890).

If you have questions or comments, please send them to editors(at)thejosias.com.

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Many thanks to our generous supporters on Patreon, who enable us to pay for podcast hosting. If you have not yet joined them, please do so. You can set up a one-time or recurring donation in any amount. Even $1 a month would be splendid.

The Josias Podcast, Special Episode: Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue (Re-Release)

This week, we at The Josias were saddened by the death of Alasdair MacIntyre, whose contributions to moral and political philosophy cannot be overstated. He was profoundly influential in the intellectual lives of many of us here at The Josias. In his memory, we are re-releasing our September 2018 Podcast episode on his book, After Virtue (1981).

Requiescat in pace.

To view the reading list for this episode, please visit the original podcast episode’s post, here.

The Josias Podcast Episode XLVIII: Ordo Amoris

Our hosts, Fr. Jon Tveit and Amanda, are joined by Pater Edmund and Fr. Joseph Hudson, OSB for a conversation about the role of the ordo amoris in Catholic intellectual tradition.

Fr. Joseph Hudson, a Benedictine priest of Clear Creek Abbey, studied philosophy before entering the cloister in 2008. In 2019 he went to Rome to earn a Licentiate in Sacred Theology at the Angelicum, later teaching at Clear Creek. In 2023, he returned to Rome to pursue a doctorate.

Bibliography:

Header Image: Dirk Jacobsz Vellert, The Vision of St. Bernard (1524)

If you have questions or comments, please send them to editors(at)thejosias.com.

Follow us on Twitter and Facebook.

Many thanks to our generous supporters on Patreon, who enable us to pay for podcast hosting. If you have not yet joined them, please do so. You can set up a one-time or recurring donation in any amount. Even $1 a month would be splendid.

Happiness as the Principle of Ethics, Law, and Rights

An earlier version of this paper was read at the Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Faculty of Law, Department for Roman Law, Budapest, February 21st, 2025. Thanks to Professor Nadja El Beheiri, Chair of the Department of Roman Law, for the invitation.

Introduction

Happiness ought to be the last end and first principle of ethics, law, and rights. By happiness, I mean here the reality pointed to by Aristotle with the term eudaimonia. I will largely be relying on Aristotle, and on his greatest medieval interpreter and developer, Thomas Aquinas, to establish my thesis. But my aim is not primarily to establish what those thinkers thought, but rather to understand the reality about which they were thinking. Nevertheless, I will attend to the ways in which the reality grasped by Aristotle in the concept eudaimonia is different from that often referred to in modern times by such words as “happiness.” I will begin (1) by looking at the Aristotelian conception of eudaimonia, paying particular attention to two features of it that contrast it with the way that happiness is often conceived of in modern discourse: (1.1) Happiness is an objective state of a human being, and (1.2) happiness is a common good. Next (2), I will consider how happiness is the principle of law (2.1) and rights (2.2). 

Continue reading “Happiness as the Principle of Ethics, Law, and Rights”

Book Review: Something for Nothing?

David Hunt, Something for Nothing?: An Explanation and Defence of the Scholastic Position on Usury  (Os Justi Press, 2024).

It is a relief that this book exists. For several years, interest in the Church’s teaching on usury has been growing for two obvious reasons. The first is that the Church no longer seems to condemn usury – perhaps it did, and perhaps it never recanted its previous statements, but it no longer actively condemns lending at interest. This would make it seem that the Church can change her teachings on some things, including things that, in the past, she had forbidden without exception. This prospect causes excitement among progressives and consternation among conservatives, the latter of whom are anxious to show that the Church’s teaching has not changed. In so doing, they often resort to a kind of magisterial triumphalism, showcasing the authoritative statements that the Church has issued and appealing to the lack of any rescinding of these statements to show that the Church’s teaching remains intact. This approach is less than impressive because – and here lies the second reason why interest in usury has been growing – it seems that, whatever the Church taught in the past, her teaching is simply no longer applicable today. Perhaps the nature of money has changed; or maybe the divines of the past did not understand the time value of money; or they paid insufficient attention to the risks that lenders assume, for which they should be justly compensated; or maybe the nature of the market today allows for the calculation of a just price for being deprived of the use of money for a given time. At the very least, it is often argued, interest could be charged on a loan to compensate a borrower for the corrosive effects that inflation has had on the value of the money he lent.

None of these arguments work. Their failure is apparent to anyone who is familiar with and understands the logic of the arguments against usury that were made by the ancient philosophers, medieval theologians, and the authors of later magisterial documents. For years, the only way for someone interested in this topic to understand the Church’s teaching on usury was to undertake the tall task of becoming familiar with all of this literature. The only comprehensive book on the subject was John T. Noonan’s The Scholastic Analysis of Usury, which is thorough and helpful as a historical resource, but which draws specious conclusions about magisterial teaching and its application. Furthermore, that it was published in 1957 and is still frequently cited in discussions of usury speaks volumes about the dearth of helpful literature on this subject. This is the lacuna that David Hunt’s Something for Nothing?: An Explanation and Defense of the Scholastic Position on Usury aims to fill, and succeeds in so doing.

Hunt’s defense of the traditional prohibition of lending at interest follows the logic that is familiar to anyone who has delved into this question at all: to charge interest on a loan is to charge both for the money lent and for the use thereof, which is inherently unjust. This position is easily defended, but objections are just as easily raised. In its defense, Hunt draws the classic distinction from Roman law between consumables and non-consumables (16ff). To own something entails having the right to destroy it. Some things, like wine, are consumed – that is, destroyed – in their use. Regarding such things, to have the right to use them is inseparable from having the right to dispose of them, which is therefore inseparable from owning them. One cannot, therefore, lend wine qua wine. 

Imagine the scenario: I invite some friends over for dinner, but I realize that I have no wine. So, I go to a wine store and – for some reason – decide to rent a bottle instead of buying one. I serve the wine at dinner, after which it is simply gone. So, when I go back to the wine store, not only do I owe the store a fee for renting the wine, but I also owe them a new bottle of wine, as the old one no longer exists. So, I have to pay for the wine and for the use of the wine. This would not be the case if, for example, I had rented a lawn mower, because in that scenario, I’d still have a lawn mower after having used it. I can pay for the use of the lawn mower without also having to pay for the lawn mower. Such examples as these illustrate the absurdity of renting consumables, which is what usurious loans attempt to do. 

But the logic goes further. Ultimately, Hunt argues, demanding interest on a loan amounts to a kind of slavery. A loan – a mutuum, to be precise – is a kind of arrangement where one person lends money to another, and this becomes usurious when the lender demands back more than what he had lent, charging the borrower both for the money borrowed and for the use thereof. In this case, the only thing guaranteeing the interest payment is the borrower himself. Thus, the lender profits off of the borrower. As Hunt eloquently puts it (72): 

The profit is derived from the personal guarantee, and the personal guarantee is recourse to the borrower himself. Therefore, to profit on a mutuum is to profit from a person. Now, it is self-evident that one can profit only from the use of one’s own property. If this were not the case, the ludicrous result would follow that one could, for one’s own gain, dispose of property owned exclusively by another person. Therefore, in profiting from a person, the lender is treating the person as his property.

Here, for Hunt, lies the essence of the injustice of usury. Usurious loans are based on a personal guarantee, not on an asset used as collateral, which distinguishes a usurious mutuum from other financial arrangements that involve lending money, some of which are justifiable. Though not unique to Hunt, this distinction between loans that are guaranteed by a person and those that are based on an asset is not stated in quite such explicit terms by Aquinas. It is, however, a helpful way of rendering what Aquinas does say and, Hunt argues, has magisterial backing (64). This distinction allows Hunt to argue that there are other kinds of profitable loans that are non-usurious and to answer objections that are commonly raised to the traditional prohibition on usury.

As an example – of which Hunt provides more – of profitable, non-usurious lending, Hunt describes the census contract. This occurs when a lender provides a borrower with a principal sum, collects payments on that sum for a specified period of time, and then is returned the principal sum at the term of the contract. This is not a mutuum and not usurious if the contract is based upon some asset, such as a field. A farmer can borrow money from a lender and, in exchange, give the lender some portion of the proceeds of his field for a certain period of time, after which he returns the money. Effectively, the lender is buying rights to proceeds from the field, and the field is put up as collateral on the principal lent. If the field fails to produce, the lender cannot demand payment from the borrower. Therefore, the lender is not treating the borrower as property, nor is he charging for something that does not exist.

This example helps to clarify the common objections, noted above, that are raised today against the traditional prohibition on usury. In answering each of these objections, Hunt artfully pivots between modern language and scholastic language, showing that something like “opportunity cost” (which Hunt equates with “lucrum cessans”) and the “time value of money” were not discoveries of the modern period that rendered the traditional prohibition on usury obsolete, but were concepts that people like Aquinas were very much aware of, whence simply appealing to them does not constitute sufficient grounds for overlooking past prohibitions on usury.

Consider the objection that risk-taking justifies the charging of interest. Hunt argues that the proper way to deal with risk is to enact an insurance contract. Insurance contracts are based on real assets which can be sold and converted into cash to cover a loss. If a lender, however, simply demands to be paid for assuming a risk without reference to any collateral, then this demand “amounts to the mere promise of the guarantor … to repay the loan with interest, which precisely is usury” (51). Hunt notes that a similar problem arises when appeals are made to inflation, the time value of money, and opportunity cost. In each case, the borrower is demanding payment for something that does not exist and expects the borrower to guarantee payment anyway. In the case of inflation, Hunt argues that demanding payment for loss incurred is implicitly to argue that the same quantity of money must always purchase the same quantity of the same kind of goods (53), which is clearly false. Furthermore, since money is a medium of exchange, its value cannot be determined by goods for which it can be exchanged in a non-arbitrary way – should the borrower owe more money on the inflated price of cars, or less money on the deflated price of electronics? In countering these objections, Hunt shows himself to be thoroughly familiar with modern thought, which sees the charging of interest as clearly justified, and medieval thought, which holds the opposite. What the reader gets is not just a quaestio disputata on usury, but an insightful treatment of financial practices rooted in a sound monetary theory that raises many other important questions.

What Hunt provides in his new book is cogent argumentation in defense of the traditional prohibition on interest-bearing loans; equally cogent argumentation against common objections to the traditional prohibition on usury that is attentive to both modern and medieval mindsets; and helpful examples – again both medieval and modern – of profitable lending that does constitute usury (like an auto loan) or does not constitute usury (like collecting interest on a government bond). He further provides a helpful analysis for determining whether a given transaction is usurious or not, which should help assuage the anxiety of those whose consciences torment them on this issue. Now that this book has been published, what the world needs is a deeper analysis of current financial practices, identifying which ones are licit and which ones are not, so that steps can be taken to render modern economic practices more just.

Ordo Amoris: Love Has an Order, Not All Are Loved Equally

Does Christian love require that we love all people equally? Some say yes. They imagine love as a boundless sea, flowing in all directions, touching every shore equally. There is something true about that. God’s love is infinite and there is nothing in creation that is not touched by it. That is perhaps an accurate image of Divine Love as certain pre-Christian thinkers might frame it. But this is not love as it is revealed to us in Sacred Scripture. It is not the way of things from the Judeo-Christian perspective. In addition to this general love, there is also a particular and special love and this love has an order. It follows a path. It is structured and intentional, like a river carving its way through the land.

Continue reading “Ordo Amoris: Love Has an Order, Not All Are Loved Equally”