By Pope St. Gelasius I

Translator’s preface: Pope St. Gelasius I (r. 492-496) will be known to Josias readers as the author of the famous letter Famuli vestrae pietatis, more commonly known by its famous phrase Duo sunt. It is the paradigmatic statement of “Gelasian dyarchy.”

Pope Gelasius here addresses the case of Peter III “The Hoarse,” patriarch of Alexandria (477-489), a Monophysite and hence an opponent of the Council of Chalcedon (451). He had been excommunicated by Pope Felix III in 484 for accepting the heretical Henoticon, or reunion formula, of the Emperor Zeno. This episode, called the Acacian Schism after the Monophysite patriarch Acacius of Constantinople who held communion with Peter the Hoarse, is described more fully in our preface to Famuli vestrae pietatis. 

In this Tome, meanwhile, Pope Gelasius insists that that imperial authorities have no power to absolve Peter from his excommunication, which is reserved to the Apostolic See. This occasions a more general discussion of the distinction between ecclesiastical and temporal authority.

Continue reading “TRACT IV or The Tome of Pope Gelasius on the Bond of Anathema”

1 Introduction

Integralism is a name that was given to the traditional political principles of Catholic Christendom at a time when those principles were coming under sustained attack by modern revolutions. Integralism is therefore traditional in the sense of belonging to a tradition. But is it traditionalist in the sense of giving importance to tradition as a measure of political and moral life? In other words: Is Integralism conservative? Does it have respect for long-established customs, and the wisdom embodied in long experience? Or is it rather a radical, puritanical doctrine that would completely remake societies on the basis of abstract, absolutist principles?

In the Catholic parts of Europe after the French Revolution, for the whole of the “long 19^th century” integralism simply was conservatism. A conservative was a defender of throne and altar—that is, an integralist.^[i] But now that the principles of the French Revolution have been established in Europe for so long, can one still call integralism conservative?

I will argue that integralism has aspects of both radicalism and conservatism. There is certainly in integralism an intransigent adherence to moral absolutes, which gives it an element of radicalism. But integralism has always also given an important place to tradition as a principle. We integralists respect the experiences of history, long-established custom, and local political variation. I want to manifest this briefly by summarizing the fundamentals of integralism as a teleological doctrine, and show how tradition is one important integralist principle among others. 

2 Integralism and Teleology

Integralism is based on a thoroughly teleological understanding of reality. It is based on an understanding of reality as most deeply explained by final causes, by goals or purposes that nature aims to reach or realize. Natures are not simple facticity, they are potentials being actualized. They are goal-directed. This understanding of reality was given an influential formulation by Aristotle. His view was profoundly consonant with that of the Hebrew scriptures and the New Testament. Hence, it is not surprising that in the Middle Ages this view was developed and extended among Christian, Jewish, and Islamic thinkers of various schools.

Applied to moral and political life, this teleological worldview has a tripartite pattern, which Alasdair MacIntyre summarizes as: 

1. human nature as it happens to be, 
2. human nature as it could be if it realized its telos, 
3. moral training and instruction as a means to move from 1 to 2.^[ii]

There is according to this scheme a basic contrast between two states of man. In the first state, man as he happens to be for the most part, morally untutored, and marked by disharmony between the higher and lower parts of his soul. He is, as Aristotle puts it, “in bondage.”^[iii] Man in this state is frustrated and miserable because he is unable to attain the good towards which his nature inclines. In the second state, man has realized his potential, there is harmony between the different powers of his soul, the passions and emotions are docile to reason, and he is able to act excellently with ease. Man in the second state is courageous, self-controlled, foresightful, generous, wise, and happy. He is constantly enjoying the goods toward which his nature strives.

Since man is a political animal, moreover, he can only have this second state as part of a virtuous community. The human good is a common good. Far from being a hindrance to his actualization, the human community is necessary to that actualization.^[iv] Man can only properly possess his good if he sees it as the good of a greater whole, a good toward which he is ordered, and for which it is noble to give his life.^[v]

The transition from the first state to the second takes place above all by habituation. This habituation is brought about in various ways. It is brought about by education, in which parents, teachers, and rulers give authoritative guidance; by the praise that is given to noble actions and the blame that is accorded to base ones; by the rewards and punishments that counteract the impulses of disordered passion; by the fitting representation of good and evil in music, poetry, and other arts; by philosophical instruction, which aids insight into the true good; and so on. All of these modes depend on the intrinsic attraction and draw of the good itself. Their role is to make it easier for the intrinsic power of the good to operate on souls. 

A particularly important role is played here by political rulers, since they order all of the other modes. As Aristotle puts it, “since politics uses the rest of the sciences, and since, again, it legislates as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain from, the end of this science must include those of the others, so that this end must be the good for man.”^[vi]

3 Nature, Grace, and the Two Powers

The Aristotelian teleological scheme is deepened by Christianity. The doctrine of original sin intensifies the contrast between the state of man as he happens to be and man as he could be. Through original sin man has lost the original harmony of his nature and it has become difficult for him to know and do the good. God first helped man through the Old Law, which instructed him in the good. But the Law was not sufficient to save fallen man. Therefore, God sent His own Son into the world to atone for original sin, heal human nature, and allow human beings a share in His divine life. It is by grace that Christ gives us a participation in His life. Grace not only heals fallen nature, it also elevates it, giving us an end higher than that to which we are ordered by nature. Grace thus founds a new community, the Church, whose common good is a supernatural good, greater than any natural fulfillment.

Grace does not replace nature, but it does subordinate natural ends to a higher end. Hence, we have a hierarchy of ends and a hierarchy of rulers. We have the natural end of human life (virtuous activity and wisdom in friendship), to which we are directed by natural (political) rulers, but we also have the supernatural end of human life (participation in God’s own activity), and we are directed to this by the rulers whom God has placed over His Church by sacramental grace, the successors of the Apostles.

From this follows the doctrine of the two powers or the two swords, which was taught already by Pope St Gelasius I in late antiquity, and which was further developed by the popes of the Middle Ages. In its details, this doctrine was highly contested, but in its basic principles it was accepted throughout Catholic Christendom. In the De Regno, St Thomas gives a summary of the basic principles which would have been broadly acceptable, and which it is worth quoting at length:

Through virtuous living man is further ordained to a higher end, which consists in the enjoyment of God. … Consequently, since society must have the same end as the individual man, it is not the ultimate end of an assembled multitude to live virtuously, but through virtuous living to attain to the possession of God. If this end could be attained by the power of human nature, then the duty of a king would have to include the direction of men to it. … Now the higher the end to which a government is ordained, the loftier that government is. Indeed, we always find that the one to whom it pertains to achieve the final end commands those who execute the things that are ordained to that end. For example, the captain, whose business it is to regulate navigation, tells the shipbuilder what kind of ship he must construct to be suitable for navigation. … But because a man does not attain his end, which is the possession of God, by human power but by divine, … therefore the task of leading him to that last end does not pertain to human but to divine government. Consequently, government of this kind pertains to that king who is not only a man, but also God, namely, our Lord Jesus Christ. … Hence a royal priesthood is derived from Him, and what is more, all those who believe in Christ, in so far as they are His members, are called kings and priests. Thus, in order that spiritual things might be distinguished from earthly things, the ministry of this kingdom has been entrusted not to earthly kings but to priests, and most of all to the chief priest, the successor of St. Peter, the Vicar of Christ, the Roman Pontiff. To him all the kings of the Christian People are to be subject as to our Lord Jesus Christ Himself. For those to whom pertains the care of intermediate ends should be subject to him to whom pertains the care of the ultimate end, and be directed by his rule.^[vii]

It is this teleological doctrine of the two powers which is today the most controversial element of integralism. But in premodern Christendom, this basic doctrine was not controversial. Controversies arose with regard to the exact scope of each of the two powers and the cases in which they could interfere with each other. But the basic teleological order of the two powers was not in doubt. I have quoted St Thomas’s teaching on this, but the teaching was by no means peculiar to the Thomistic School. As Timothy Gerard Aloysius Wilson has shown, all of the schools of the first and of the second scholasticism shared this doctrine; we find it not only among the Thomists, but also among Scotists, and later among Molinists, Suarezians, and so on. 

Even Dante, in the De Monarchia, with its vehement defense of the distinction of imperial from papal power, concludes by conceding the point:

But the truth of this final question must not be restricted to mean that the Roman Prince shall not be subject in some degree to the Roman Pontiff, for felicity that is mortal is ordered in a measure after felicity that is immortal. Wherefore let Caesar honor Peter as a first-born son should honor his father, so that, refulgent with the light of paternal grace, he may illumine with greater radiance the earthly sphere over which he has been set by Him who alone is Ruler of all things spiritual and temporal.^[viii]

In the 19^th century, this teaching was vehemently defended by the integralist as an important consequence of a properly teleological understanding of nature and grace. The defense of the doctrine of the two swords was a defense of the primacy of the spiritual, the finality of the spiritual end, and of the social Kingship of Christ. As Father Félix Sardá y Salvany, one of the leading thinkers of 19^thcentury integralism, put it:

[The] Integralism [the liberals] abhor and continuously revile is the integralism of the social rights of Christ-God, the Integralism of his divine sovereignty over States as much as over individuals. … [The] Integralism of the social laws of God and His holy Church is what we may call the fundamental Integralism.^[ix]

And in the Manifesto of Burgos, the founding document of the first political movement to be explicitly called “integralist,” the principle is explained as follows:

As the body to the soul, so must the state be united and subordinated to the Church, the lesser luminary to the greater, the temporal sword to the spiritual sword, according to the terms and conditions that the Church of God lays down, and are established in our traditional laws.^[x]

Note that the Manifesto of Burgos makes appeal to the “traditional laws” of Catholic Spain when it comes to the application of the principle. What role does integralism give to such traditional laws?

4 Teleology and Tradition

To readers of Hegelian philosophy, the notion of teleology might suggest the notion of social progress. But it is not difficult to see that the teleological scheme that I have sketched is in fact antithetical to modern progressivism. Every human being begins from square one with human nature in its untutored state, wounded by original sin, with reason out of harmony with the passions. Every human being must be rectified and perfected by the acquisition of good habits, both natural and supernatural. This rectification takes place by means of habituation, which is in effect the conforming of the individual to a traditional way of life, handed down from the excellent men of the past. Excellence is not achieved by innovation, but rather by conformity to the best models. The perfect man, Jesus Christ Himself, is the unsurpassable model, and the great saints of the early Church are the best mirror of His perfection. The ardor of the early days has waned, and so the expectation is of a tendency toward decline, which has to be resisted by constant striving to recover the excellence of the past. The human telos is fixed and determined, as are the means of approaching it. 

A good society is therefore a traditional society in which new generations are taught to imitate their elders and aspire to the excellence of their ancestors. A good society is also a hierarchical society, in which the necessary superiority of rulers is seen as beneficial to subjects, who are led thereby to their true happiness. The harmonious and hierarchical order of the parts of society reflects the harmonious and hierarchal order of the parts of the soul.

Progressivism, by contrast, in both of its main forms, is based on a rejection of the teleological scheme. One form of progressivism, which we can see in the tradition of Hobbes and of classical political economy, sees human beings as essentially selfish, slaves of restless passions, with no true telos, and no common good that could unite them to others. Social progress is achieved by setting up social mechanisms by which the self-interest of each furthers the general interest of all. Social progress is cumulative and linear, because it does not depend on the moral formation of the individual, but on the unintended consequences of non-moral actions.

Another form of progressivism, which can be seen in the tradition of Rousseau, sees human passion and feeling as basically good and generous, but corrupted by the artificial constraints of society. Progress is achieved, therefore, by eliminating social constraints on authentic feeling. This is the ideology that we see, for example, in the sexual revolution. Social progress is seen as cumulative and linear, because it depends not on the difficult struggle for virtue that has to be repeated in each human life, but rather on the abolition of repressive taboos which prevent the unimpeded expression of passion.

Integralism is implacably opposed to both forms of progressivism. Human happiness is achieved not by economic or social liberalism, but rather by conservatism. That is, to use Yoram Hazony’s description of conservatism, by propagating “beneficial ideas, behaviors, and institutions across generations.”^[xi]

5 Two Objections

To clarify in what sense integralism can be conservative, I want to consider two (nearly) opposite objections which have recently been brought against integralism. The first objection is based on the work of the philosopher Robert Spaemann, which sees integralism as in a sense too conservative, based on a reduction of questions of truth to questions of the utility for the conservation of social order. I will argue that integralism is not, in fact, conservative in that sense. The second objection comes out of the tradition of Edmund Burke. It sees integralism as too rationalistic and abstract, a radical, puritanical doctrine, that would completely remake societies on the basis of abstract, absolutist principles. I will argue that integralism can in fact be more conservative than this objection supposes.

5.1 The Spaemannian Objection

The philosopher Robert Spaemann argued that Louis de Bonald and other Catholic reactionaries in their attempt to refute the Revolution and defend tradition, actually reinterpreted the tradition in modern terms. Their reactionary mode of thinking, he argues, “converts ontological truths into social functions, thus paving the way both for the reduction of truth to ideology and for truth to function as ideology.”^[xii] This error of Bonald’s was, Spaemann suggests, compounded in later authoritarian thinkers such as Charles Maurras.^[xiii] Writers such as Michael Hanby, D.C. Schindler, and Reuben Slife have recently suggested that this Spaemannian critique of reactionary thought can be applied to integralism.

Now, Spaemann’s argument does contain an important insight. There were errors in the reactionary thought of thinkers such as de Bonald and de Maistre, which led to even worse errors in thinkers such as Charles Maurras and Carl Schmitt. They were indeed too marked by Hobbesian and Romantic ideas and did not think metaphysically and teleologically enough. Nevertheless, a careful reader ought to be able to distinguish their thought from that of Catholic integralists, even when the latter at times made common cause with them. For example, the great integralist theologian Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange saw Maurras as an ally in the anti-liberal struggle prior to the condemnation of Maurras’s movement by the Holy See. In his introduction to St Thomas’s On Kingship, Garrigou even makes use of Maurras’s slogan politique d’abord (‘politics first’). Now, for Maurras that slogan was certainly an expression of sociological reductionism: social utility is the ultimate measure of truth. But this is not at all the way Garrigou, as a good Thomist, uses the slogan:

We note, furthermore, that the imperium or command, which directs the execution of the means chosen beforehand, proceeds in the reverse of the order of deliberation. In place of descending from the consideration of the end to be attained to that of the subordinated means last of all, command begins by applying this infirm means and raising it afterwards little by little to the superior means capable of obtaining the end pursued: Finis est primum in intentione et ultimum in executione. From this point of view one understands that in the order of execution, but not in the order of intention, one could say: politique d’abord. [In order that] social life may be possible, the city or country must be habitable, and the agitators must be expelled or brought to reason.^[xiv]

In other words, Garrigou-Lagrange saw in Maurras’s movement a useful counter to the “agitators” who were destroying France, but he by no means succumbed to Maurras’s reductionism.

I would make the same point about the use that I and other contemporary integralists have occasionally made of the writings of Schmitt. I see some helpful insights in Schmitt’s critique of liberalism and in his early work on political representation (Roman Catholicism and Political Form), but I have no use whatever for the Hobbesian decisionism and sociological reductionism seemingly implied by Schmitt’s Political Theology.^[xv]

Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical Æterni patris, which called for Catholic philosophy to be based on St Thomas was, I believe, partly inspired by the insight that the reactionary philosophy in vogue among many 19^th century Catholics was too modern, too reductionist, and not realist and teleological enough. To be healthy, Catholic philosophy ought to turn to the most solid of the medieval scholastics. I fully agree with Pope Leo in this, as did the great integralists of the last century, men such as Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, Louis Billot, Raphael Cardinal Merry del Val, Henri Grenier, Charles De Koninck, Louis Lachance, and Marcel de Corte.

5.2 The Burkean Objection

The second objection to integralism is in some ways the opposite of the first. It holds not that integralism is not metaphysical enough, but rather that it is too metaphysical, too abstract, too rationalistic. I once had a small exchange with the late Sir Roger Scruton in the pages of First Things in which Scruton raised just such an objection. I had argued that Scruton was too wary of a paternalistic understanding of politics, and Scruton responded as follows:

As for Fr. Waldstein’s theological vision of the good of government, I can only respond as Burke responded to the Reason advocated by the French Revolutionaries. He wrote: ‘We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason; because we suspect that this stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations and of ages.’

Advocates of natural law in the Catholic tradition have often told us that the good is discoverable to reason, and that we have only to consult it. But they tend to be as reluctant as Waldstein to define who is doing the consulting, and how. Burke’s view, that there is a kind of reason that emerges through civil association, and which is both conserved in our traditions and irretrievably dispersed by the attempt to make it explicit, offers, to my mind, a better model of the place of reason in government. On Burke’s view, rational solutions emerge from below, by an invisible hand, and are not imposed from above by those who claim to have privileged knowledge of the natural law. (The same point is made in other terms by Hayek, in his defense of the common law.) One can agree with Kant’s warning against paternal government without thinking that ‘any submission to an authority other than the self is tyrannical.’ As I understand it, the art of living in society is precisely the art of submitting to authority—but doing so willingly, and in the little platoons that we ourselves create.^[xvi]

Certainly, as an integralist I think that there are absolutely fixed moral truths that can be known both through reason and through revelation, and that the Catholic Church is the authoritative teacher about such truths. In that sense, I am not a conservative, that is, I am not a defeatist. No matter how long-established a certain moral error is in a society, no matter how universally it is accepted, I believe that it ought to be rooted out. Thus, for example, I do not think that we should ever give up the struggle against so-called “gay marriage,” no matter how long that practice has been established.

Nevertheless, I do think that there is a lot of truth to what Scruton was saying. There is a danger to seeing morality as a simple matter of rationalist deduction, as the Revolutionaries saw it, and of the impulse to simply overturn social order in accordance with such deduction. As I indicated above, morality is largely a matter of habituation, not deduction, and this demands a whole system of social traditions to be effectively carried on from one generation to the next. To the extent that there are still social traditions that are in accord with truth, they ought to be conserved. 

Moreover, most political questions are not a matter of moral absolutes. When it comes to the form of government, for example, I hold with Pope Leo XIII that monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy (as well as mixtures of the three) can all be just, as long as they pursue the true human good. On such questions I think we should indeed conserve the traditions of particular places and peoples. Even in the application of moral absolutes, we should be gentle and cautious. St Benedict of Nursia issues a warning to a zealous abbot that is equally applicable to politicians:

He must hate faults but love the brothers. When he must punish them, he should use prudence and avoid extremes; otherwise, by rubbing too hard to remove the rust, he may break the vessel.[xvii]

This, I believe, is how the restoration of a good society should take place, cautiously, lovingly, with reverence for the good that already exists, and nostalgia for the good that has passed away.

---

This paper is based on a talk which I gave at the Working-group on Conservatism in Europe (WoCE) Hosted by The European Conservative, Vienna, Austria, September 6^th, 2023. My thanks to Mario Fantini for the invitation, and to all the participants for their helpful discussion.

^[i] For the origins of the term “integralist” see the editor’s introductory note to Félix Sardá y Salvany, “Integralists?” trans. HHG, The Josias (2022), thejosias.com/2022/03/02/felix-sarda-y-salvany-on-the-word-integralists (accessed September 8^th, 2023).

^[ii] Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 3^rd ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 53.

^[iii] Metaphysics, Bk. I, ch. 2, 982b30.

^[iv] Cf. MacIntyre, After Virtue, 229.

^[v] See: Edmund Waldstein, “The Primacy of the Common Good,” The Josias (2023) thejosias.com/2023/06/19/the-primacy-of-the-common-good (accessed September 4^th, 2023).

^[vi] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. I, ch. 2, 1094b5.

^[vii] De Regno, I.15.

^[viii] De Monarchia, III.XVI.9.

^[ix] Sardá, “Integralists?”

^[x] “Como el cuerpo al alma ha de estar unido y subordinado el Estado á la Iglesia, el luminar menor al mayor, la espada temporal a la espiritual, en los términos y condiciones que la Iglesia de Dios señala, como lo establecen nuestras leyes tradicionales.” [Manifestación hecha en Burgos por la prensa tradicionalista el mes de julio de 1888 (Madrid: Gabriel López, 1903), 20].

^[xi] Yoram Hazony, Conservatism: A Rediscovery (London: Forum, 2022), xvi.

^[xii] Michael Hanby, “Are We Postliberal Yet?” New Polity 3.3, 11-27, at 16, footnote 16.

^[xiii] Robert Spaemann, Der Ursprung der Soziologie aus dem Geist der Restauration: Studien über L.G.A. de Bonald (München: Kösel, 1959), 181-191. This book was based on Spaemann’s dissertation, written under the direction of Joachim Ritter in Münster. Ritter was a liberal conservative, who wanted to move German conservatives away from nostalgia for past political forms, and towards support for the Christian Democratic principles of the Federal Republic of Germany. It is easy to see how a critique of Bonald’s intransigent support of the Ancien Régime fits into Ritter’s project.

^[xiv] Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, On Royal Government, trans. Andrew Strain, www.academia.edu/8384944/Translation_of_Garrigou_Lagranges_On_Royal_Government (accessed September 4^th, 2023), 9.

^[xv] Schmitt is notoriously difficult to pin down, and it is not clear to what extent he actually holds the decisionism that he describes.

^[xvi] “Letters,” First Things (October 2014).

^[xvii] Regula Benedicti, 64:11-13.

By Urban Hannon

The following lecture was delivered at the Pro Civitate Dei summer school in La Londe-les-Maures, France on June 12, 2022.

Listen to audio of this essay here.

Let’s start with a little guided meditation. I want you to imagine a society—a society made up of self-absorbed, atomized individuals—a society in which the various members tolerate each other, because they know they need each other, but only so that each of them can achieve his own private ambitions and desires—a society, moreover, that is in open rebellion against its own origins. Sound familiar yet? Now I want you to imagine that, once upon a time, this society had been noble, and civil, and good—but that its citizens—especially its elite citizens—out of a disordered sense of pride, effected a revolution against that received ancient order. Imagine, if you will, that this revolution had some ironic consequences, such as that, in the name of liberating themselves from being subject to any official king, these citizens wound up creating for themselves an even more oppressive and authoritarian regime—and that their honorable hierarchy, which in their pettiness they would have liked to dissolve altogether, was merely replaced by a dishonorable hierarchy—that they traded an ordered harmony for hostile power relations, and a common good for private vices. Now imagine that this populace—who, again, hate their own heritage and devote all their time and energy to contradicting it, loudly—is in fact deeply unsatisfied, frustrated, lonely, sad. And yet imagine that, despite their unhappiness in this society, they also live in constant, ever-growing fear—fear that this society of theirs, and everything it stands for, is on the verge of defeat. Imagine, finally, that this hysterical anxiety of theirs makes them even more odious and offensive and obnoxious. Probably by now you are not having to imagine, because unfortunately what I have been describing is not imaginary. This is a society—or at least, a “society”—which is very real, which is all around us, and with which we are forced to interact on a daily basis. I am speaking, of course, of the society of Satan and his demons. This is a talk about the politics of hell.

Before we descend into the Inferno, however, I should say one preliminary word of thanks. Now I had hoped that the good Pater Edmund Waldstein might be here with us today, not because he’s who I am thanking, but because I was hoping at this point to get to troll him a bit with acronyms. You see, as some of you might already know, our friend Pater Edmund despises acronyms, complaining that “they impede signification and thought”—and so it is a good thing that Pater lives in Vienna rather than Rome, like me, because in the Eternal City the Church uses a seeming infinity of them. Every document, every dicastery, every degree has its own two- or three-letter abbreviation, and to keep up in conversation you are expected to be familiar with a rolodex worth, else you’re going to be confused by “CDW”—err, “DDW”—and alarmed by “STD.” My favorite Roman acronym, however, is for the Pontificia Academia Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, the Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas: P-A-S-T-A: PASTA. And my word of thanks today is for the PASTA president, who, ironically, is a Frenchman. Fr. Serge-Thomas Bonino is a Dominican friar of the Toulouse province, my professor at the Angelicum, and probably the world’s foremost expert on the angelology of St. Thomas Aquinas. (The only person who could maybe compete for that title is Tobias Hoffmann, previously of CUA and now of the Sorbonne, who works on the fall of the demons and its implications for action theory—but I digress.) Fr. Serge-Thomas Bonino teaches in Italian and publishes almost exclusively in French, but his one book that is presently available in English translation is relevant to our topic today: Angels and Demons, of no-not-that-Angels–and–Demons fame. Even more relevant, for those who have French, is an essay Fr. Bonino wrote in Revue Thomiste back in 2013, “Les écailles de Léviathan: ou de l’organisation de la société des démons selon les théologiens du treizième siécle”—“The Scales of Leviathan: Or On the Organization of the Demons’ Society According to Thirteenth-Century Theologians.” Most relevant of all, however, for those who have Italian—and a sabbatical—are Fr. Bonino’s classes in Rome. I was blessed to take one with him this past semester on evil, the final dispensa for which ended up coming in at exactly 666 kilobytes (I don’t think he planned that but I also wouldn’t put it past him)—as well as one on Satan and the demons, fittingly located in Room 6, which you might remember as the name of Christine Taylor’s 2006 horror movie about devil-worshipping doctors. All of this just to say: I will be borrowing heavily from Fr. Bonino in this lecture—which is not to imply that he would necessarily endorse all of its integralist conclusions—and if you are interested in learning more about these things after today there is no better man to turn to than Fr. Bonino. Thus concludes the acronyms-and-acknowledgements section of this talk.

As we turn to consider the demons themselves, I should warn you that we will not really be getting to their politics proper until the second half of this lecture. I hope it is fair to assume that I am not speaking to a room of professional angelologists, so we will have a good amount of ground to cover on our way there, so that we can appreciate what we will find when we arrive. I think it is best to begin by situating demonology within the whole of Christian theology, because there is always a risk of exaggerating the importance of Satan, or of becoming inordinately curious about the workings of the underworld. Don’t get me wrong: The demons are very real, and so is spiritual warfare. But, it turns out, indulging a morbid fascination with the devil is a great way to lose in that spiritual warfare. To steal St. John the Divine’s phrase from his letters to the churches in the Apocalypse: Beware of “scrutinizing the depths of Satan.” The demons have their place in our Catholic doctrine, therefore, but it is important to be clear about what that place is, and not to let them leave it. Here is how Fr. Bonino began our course this year:

The Catholic Church’s teaching on Satan and the demons is not at all the center of Christian revelation. It is a side teaching, a marginal doctrine, that is, a peripheral truth in the hierarchy of revealed truths. It needs to remain so. A preaching of the Christian faith obsessed with the devil would be completely unbalanced. Indeed, the doctrine on Satan must be subordinated to and integrated with the most fundamental truths of the faith: the mystery of God and of his loving plans brought about by the victory of Christ, which frees believers from the powers of evil. Therefore, Satan’s place in the Christian faith is precisely under the feet of the risen Christ.

End quote, and mic drop. Now, obviously I would not be talking about the politics of hell today if I didn’t think there were something valuable for us to learn from it. But the point is that our interest needs to be mortified, limited to what we can know from the science of metaphysics and from sacra doctrina, and exclusively ordered to our Christian beatitude and the glory of God.

Allora, to understand the demons’ politics, which is part of what they do, first we need to know something about the demons’ nature and condition, which is part of what they are. Agere sequitur esse, right?: “Action follows being,” second act follows on first act. We’ll take two different paths to try to get there: from above, and from the side—that is, by considering what these spiritual substances are in general, and by contrasting the demons with their angelic counterparts. Let’s take the first one first, because it is always better to treat common things before particular ones, or else you end up just having to repeat yourself. (That, by the way—short side rant here—is why in the Summa St. Thomas considers the divine essence before he considers the processions of the divine persons, De Deo Uno before De Deo Trino. It was fashionable in the twentieth century to complain that St. Thomas was thereby subordinating the Most Holy Trinity to merely philosophical questions about God’s simplicity and goodness and perfection and infinity and so forth, but the truth is that St. Thomas was just better at methodology than his critics. If he had started with the persons, then in treating the Father he’d have had to talk about the Father’s simplicity and goodness etc., and then have more articles later about the Son’s simplicity and goodness etc., and then again for the Holy Spirit. It should have been obvious that he is beginning not with some deist rationalist God of the philosophers, but rather with what the three divine persons—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—have in common.)

So then, when it comes to the angels and demons, to “angels” considered indifferently, what do they have in common? We get a first clue from St. Thomas’ preferred name for them: not “angels,” which he usually reserves just for the lowest of the choirs, but rather—a term and an idea that originates in Aristotle—“separated substances.” Separated, one might rightly wonder, from what? And the answer, in a word, is: matter. The angels are substances—analogically but truly—beings which exist in themselves and not in another. But unlike any of the substances we experience here below, they have no matter whatsoever, but are pure form. St. Bonaventure would object to this, and indeed he tried to find some kind of non-bodily “spiritual matter” for the angels to have to distinguish them from the totally immaterial God, but St. Thomas will have none of it, since this spiritual matter of Bonaventure’s in principle cannot play the metaphysical role he would need it to play. We can’t enter into the details of that De Ente et Essentia argument (it’s in number 70, if you would like to check it yourself). But in the Thomistic picture—the correct picture—that I am sketching for you today, the angels are going to be totally immaterial. They are still infinitely inferior to God, because their angelic simplicity does not reach to the distinction of being and essence. But in terms of essence itself, the angels really are immaterial and simple.

They are forms, and so minds, and so, by Boethius’ famous definition, persons. Each one is “an individual substance of a rational nature”—or, better, an individual substance which also just is a rational nature—or an intellectual nature, to be more precise. For each of the angels is a species and indeed a genus unto himself, since matter is precisely what multiplies individual instances of a particular species, and the matter-form distinction is the basis of the genus-difference distinction. Lacking matter, every angel is individual and species and genus unto himself, and in the angel there is no real difference between these. It would be as though “James” and “rational” and “animal” were all identical and coextensive—in reality if not in concept—which is wild to try to wrap your mind around. Therefore, the words “angel” and “seraphim” and “separated substance” and incredibly even “substance” itself, when applied to them, do not correspond to essential kinds of things, a common sort of nature shared among many of them. Instead, these names are just convenient designators for us as we try to talk about all of these spirits who are simpler and higher than we are in the great chain of being. Our human knowledge is proportioned to sensible stuff, and so when we think or speak about angels we are already out of our depth, and we cannot see or say precisely what each of them is. So we speak in generalizations, even while knowing that there is nothing general in any of their natures, but only in the order of our minds. This was perhaps the greatest improvement Aristotle made over Plato: the insight that knowledge is in the mode of the knower, which does not necessarily correspond to the mode of the thing known. We men understand and speak of angels as though they were composed of genus and species, but that tells you something about how we think, not about how they are. For each of them is absolutely unique, and completely exhausts what he is, in a way that no individual man or dog or oak could totally actualize all the potencies of its species. In terms of his nature, therefore, every angel is simple and even relatively infinite and, in the proper sense, perfect.

As for the relations between these perfect substances, since each is a species unto himself, no two are alike, and—see Metaphysics Book Eight—therefore no two are equal. Each one is either higher or lower than any other one, such that they all come together to form a great linear hierarchy, a single-file line from the highest seraph down to the lowest guardian angel, with an innumerable multitude in between. On the subject of that multitude: One of the rare times that St. Thomas Aquinas criticizes Aristotle is over the number of these separated substances. Aristotle had been far too stingy in estimating that number, admitting only as many angels as there were distinct and irreducible kinds of motion, each one, he thought, initiated by a different separate substance. In the De Substantiis Separatis, St. Thomas prefers Plato’s much more generous reckoning of the number of angels, going so far as to describe Plato as representing the via sufficientior, in contradistinction to Aristotle’s via manifestior. Aristotle may proceed along “the more manifest way,” taking us by the hand and leading us step by step from things that are better known to us to their lesser-known implications. But Plato offers “the more sufficient way,” harder to see along but arriving at a more sweeping view of the truth of things—in this case, the enormity of the heavenly host. St. Thomas quotes the prophet Daniel for a scriptural warrant here, who says of the Ancient of Days, “Thousands of thousands ministered to him, and ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before him.” St. Thomas reasons that, in creating, God intends chiefly the perfection of the universe, and so, the more perfect something is, the more of it we ought to expect to find in the created universe. But spirits are more perfect than bodies, so there will be even more angels in creation than there are corporeal substances—maybe vastly more. We might also think of the “myriads of angels” from Hebrews—or of the Church Fathers’ taking the one lost sheep to be mankind, in comparison with the ninety-nine angels. In fact, properly speaking “number” cannot apply to angels anyway, since number follows upon dimensive quantity which presupposes matter. And so the separated substances are strictly numberless. As Thomas quotes Denys as saying of the angels: “Many are the blessed armies of the supernal minds, exceeding the weak and constricted measure of our material numbers.”

What, then, does this numberless hierarchy do—or, we should ask instead: What is it supposed to do? Here we turn from our consideration of separated substances in general to a quick consideration of the good angels in particular, because we want to understand the demons and our weak intellects tend to appreciate things more by contrast with their opposites, but also because evil can only be understood indirectly anyway, in relation to the good. The good angels live peacefully in their hierarchy, etymologically their “sacred principate,” where St. Thomas defines “principate” as “one multitude ordered in one way under the government of a prince.” In this case, of course, the prince of the hierarchy is God himself. Now the angels have three functions in their hierarchy, for the sake of those below them in line: to purge or cleanse, to illumine or enlighten, and to perfect or unite to God. St. Thomas receives this threefold procedure from St. Denys the Areopagite—the “Pseudo-Dionysius,” if you like, and I do not—from his great treatise on the angels The Celestial Hierarchy. (Fun fact: The word “hierarchy” seems to have been invented by St. Denys himself in this very work.) You might recognize this triad from more modern spirituality literature, which tries to divvy up people’s Christian progress into the purgative way, the illuminative way, and the unitive way. I’ll be honest with you: I usually find such attempts unhelpful, too narcissistic and too experientialist, trying to make a science of something that just isn’t scientific, wanting to discern—or impose—a set of universalizable phenomena upon the spiritual life, which doesn’t work, and isn’t the point. But I flag it here just to note that the origin of the purgative, illuminative, and unitive is precisely the angelic hierarchy—and then the ecclesiastical sacraments that are our human participation in it. The good angels are constantly communicating God’s goodness to those further down the hierarchy, drawing them further up and further into the happiness of God, by purifying, enlightening, and perfecting those entrusted to their care.

What form this action takes depends upon where exactly the angel falls in rank. St. Denys had turned to scripture to learn about the various classes of angels within their overall ordering—to Isaiah, Ezekiel, Colossians, Ephesians, Jude—and so it is to St. Denys that we owe the traditional nine choirs of angels: three hierarchies, each with three orders within them: seraphim, cherubim, thrones; then dominions, virtues, powers; and finally principalities, archangels, and angels. (You might remember the scene from Canto 28 of Dante’s Paradiso, where Beatrice recalls that St. Gregory the Great had arrived into heaven, beheld the angelic orders, and been forced to admit that Denys was right and he was wrong, since he—Gregory—had switched the virtues and the principalities. “Di sé medesmo rise,” Beatrice says: “He smiled at his mistake.” But St. Thomas is nicer than Dante, and he gives St. Gregory the Great a way to save face by saying that both accounts are reasonable and that they might even amount to different words for the same teaching.) We will leave aside the details of the incredibly intricate bureaucracy of this ninefold order, which Fr. Bonino joked would be the envy even of the Italian administrative state. In fact St. Thomas says that, if we knew the angels perfectly, we would know it to be even more intricate, because rather than nine generalized choirs, in which the higher ones tend to look up to God and the lower ones tend to look down for creation, we would see that every single angel has his own particular role to play in the hierarchy. Nonetheless, do notice that the word “choir” is especially appropriate here, since the noblest work of all the angels—even more important than their purifying, illuminating, perfecting—is the laus perennis, the praise of God. The action of the good angels is first and foremost a liturgical action—as ours is meant to be too. And indeed, it is for the sake of God’s glory that the higher angels assist those subject to them in the hierarchy, inviting them to worship God and enabling them to do so as beautifully as possible.

We turn, at last, to the demons themselves. I will not say too much here about the fall of the demons, which—in better ages that could sustain serious speculative theology—was always the subject of controversy. For those who are interested in additional reading, I think St. Thomas’ best treatment of the demons’ fall, which corrects certain problems in his earlier attempt from the Prima Pars of the Summa, comes in Question 16, Article 4 of the De Malo, his Disputed Questions on Evil. Suffice it to say that Thomas presents all the separated substances as having been created in grace, with a first moment of natural knowledge and love for God, and after this another moment in which the angels charitably accepted, and the demons pridefully rejected, the call to a supernatural knowledge and love of God. Fr. Bonino explains the devil’s motivation thus:

Satan, in his pride, considered the conditions [of this supernatural invitation] humiliating. He regarded them as evil and therefore preferred to stick to the enjoyment of his own natural perfection insofar as, first, it belongs to him by right of nature as if he were its master, and, second, it distinguishes him from others. He preferred to remain first in the lower order instead of becoming one among others in the higher order. He has experienced the drama of the little boy who has to leave elementary school, where he is the senior, the “boss,” to move on to sixth grade where he would become the smallest among the big boys.

And so Satan spurned God’s invitation to a supernatural destiny, in a kind of diabolical version of Peter Pan Syndrome, with the other rebel angels as his Lost Boys. As punishment for this narcissism—ever since that moment of perfect, eternal demerit—the demons have experienced the pain of loss: the deprivation of the beatific vision and friendship with God, which is the only true happiness. Additionally, as further consequences of that most capital punishment, the demons’ intellects also have been darkened vis-à-vis supernatural knowledge; their wills have been made obstinate; they have suffered grief in the resistance of their wills to the way things are (Fr. Bonino says that they are “allergic to reality”); and they have been cast into hell and the earth’s dark atmosphere as places of punishment for their original—and perpetual—sin.

What is surprising, however—and what will be especially pertinent to the demons’ political arrangements—is just how much stayed the same for the demons despite their fall. Their natures, in fact, are entirely intact. I’m sure everyone here is familiar with the Thomistic adage “Grace perfects nature,” but the flipside of that is that sin does not destroy nature either—for us or for the demons. Both grace and sin are accidental modifications of a stable underlying substance. Otherwise, if grace were to replace nature rather than perfecting it, then among other absurd consequences, converting to the faith would actually be bad for me, because the me there would cease to exist and give way to some totally different person who would step in to take my place. This is not what the tradition means by “putting off the old man.” Now it’s true that grace, as a participation in the divine life of the Most Holy Trinity, is actually nobler in its essence than the human soul. Nevertheless, in its mode of being it is still just an accident, a quality—an “entitative habitus,” if you like—existing in the substance that is man. So likewise, sin is an accidental corruption, not an essential one. This is not to downplay how bad it is: All of our blessedness or wretchedness is a matter of accidents. Only God is happy just by his essence. But it is to say that sin leaves intact the underlying nature of the sinner. And so, whatever the demons possessed by nature in that first prelapsarian moment of grace, they still have today in their state of punishment. St. Thomas constantly repeats this Dionysian principle from the Celestial Hierarchy: “Certain gifts were bestowed upon the demons which, we say, have not been changed at all, but remain whole and most splendid”—“integra et splendidissima.”

The demons are morally bad, therefore, but still naturally good. The reason for this goes back to St. Augustine: Good and evil are not symmetrical. We do not inhabit a dualistic world, with equal and opposite forces of light and darkness warring against each other. On the contrary, all that is, inasmuch as it is, is good. Evil is merely a perversion, a corruption, the privation of a due good in a subject that ought to have it. And so the demons cannot be evil through and through, because evil is a parasite, and it cannot exist except in a good host. Evil is a perversion, and there cannot be a perversion that is not a perversion of something. In the case of the demons, that something is their good nature, and its good natural powers. They are putting these talents to awful ends, but the talents themselves persist. As St. Thomas says, “Although [the demons] do not have the purity that is through grace, nevertheless they have purity of nature”—“puritas naturae.” But being implies order, and therefore something of their original order remains for them as well. We arrive, at last, at the politics of hell.

The primary place where St. Thomas Aquinas discusses the political order of the demons is in the Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, Question 109. As I hope you know already, the Prima Pars is about God—specifically, the divine essence, the distinction of divine persons, and the procession of creatures from him. Unsurprisingly, Question 109 falls in the third of those, on the procession of creatures, and more precisely within the final division of that part, on the divine governance of creatures. This question has four articles: Article 1 asks whether there are orders among the demons; Article 2, whether there is authority, or precedence, among them; Article 3, whether they illumine one another; and Article 4, whether they are subject to the authority of the good angels. Let’s take each in turn.

The first article asks of the order of hell utrum sit, “whether it is,” whether the demons have any politics at all. The casual reader of the Summa might find that he relates to the objectors more intuitively than usual with this article, since there seem to be good reasons for believing that the demons’ fall from grace would also be a fall from sociability. It is true, of course, that the will of the demons is permanently perverted, and that they are thus incapable of a genuine communion with others. It is also true that the further one descends away from God, the principle of unity, the less cohesion and the more anarchy one will find. Still, anarchy is like evil—indeed, it just is evil in the realm of political order—and so it can never exist in a pure form. Anarchy must always presume some sort of society as its subject. As Fr. Bonino says,

The idea of chaos or of absolute anarchy is as contradictory as the idea of absolute evil. As evil is a parasite on the good, so anarchy is a parasite on order. If ever anarchy were to triumph, it would immediately self-destruct, like Samson under the ruins of his own victory. In the world of the demons, therefore, there remains a certain order which, in the midst of disaster, continues to bear witness to the goodness and wisdom of God. Thus, according to St. Thomas, the demonic world retains the structure of the various angelic orders from which the rebellious angels fell.

Now, the original hierarchy of the angels according to nature was meant to be fulfilled and perfected in the hierarchy of grace—and, unlike us men whose heavenly glory will depend upon our charity over the extended course of this life, for the angels God distributed grace and thus glory simply according to the proportions of their natures, so that, for the good angels, their hierarchy now corresponds exactly to their hierarchy at creation, only without the would-be-demons in between them. The demons, of course, have definitively fallen from that order of grace. But St. Thomas teaches that the gifts of grace provide the formal element of the angelic hierarchy, and natural gifts the material element. Once again, grace perfects what nature disposes. And so the demons, the fallen angels, keep exactly the same order vis-à-vis their fellow demons that they had before the fall, because those natural dispositions, that matter for the hierarchy, has endured unchanged. Fr. Bonino compared this unfulfilled demonic ordering to the foundations of a house whose construction has been halted for lack of money. And this, by the way, makes some sense out of St. Paul’s continuing to refer to the demons by the names of the angelic choirs: “For our wrestling is not against flesh and blood, but against principalities and powers,” etc. According to St. Thomas, those are the orders to which these demons first belonged, and from which they fell.

There is some question as to whether this ladder of demonic descent still deserves the name “hierarchy.” After all, as we have seen already, “hierarchy” means precisely a holy principate. But the demons are not holy, and neither, especially, is their satanic prince. Nevertheless, St. Thomas is still willing to extend the term “hierarchy” to them, not because the demons’ own wills are holy, abused as these wills are for the sake of evil, but rather because the one who has ordered the demons from their creation is holy: God himself. Moreover, even after their fall, God uses these demonic orders for his own holy ends: to prove the saints and increase their merits, and to exact his divine justice upon the wicked. Even the demons are accounted for in St. Paul’s saying that all things work together for the good of those who love God. And so the demons—despite themselves and their own wicked intentions—somehow still inhabit a hierarchy. There is a twofold ordering of the Inferno: under Satan internally, and under God according to their integration into the general order of divine providence—and this latter satisfies for the definition of “hierarchy.”

Thus everything is still in place, in the demons’ social arrangements, and yet nothing is quite the same. Fr. Bonino suggests two analogies for this phenomenon which are more familiar to our experience:

In a corpse, all order, all structure does not disappear immediately [after death]. Although the soul, the principle of unity for the macrostructure, is absent, nevertheless the microstructures retain their nature, their respective properties as well as their interactions. However, the processes carried out by the microstructures are no longer in the service of the life of the organic whole. Or—to take a less macabre comparison—the collapse of the central political power at the end of the Carolingian Empire did not bring about the disappearance of all social life, but only caused its parceling out and feudalization, with many small local powers. The same happens with the society of the demons. When these angels freely reject their supernatural purpose, still their natural structures, which derive from the ontological relations between the pure spirits, do not disappear. They remain, however, mutilated and perverted.

Even bad men are political animals, and even bad angels are—granted, not animals, but—still political. Their society has an internal coherence and thus a form of unity, meaning that it is undivided in itself and divided from all others. And lest anyone should worry that this is all just Neoplatonists imposing their neurotic cosmic ordering on everything they can imagine, remember that our Lord himself referred to the City of Evil as a “kingdom”—a “βασιλεία,” in the Greek—a “regnum,” in the original language of sacred scripture.

Article 2 of Question 109 concerns the king of this kingdom: the devil, or Satan. Just as the demons’ nature guarantees them some preservation of hierarchy, so it also guarantees them some preservation of headship. The reason, once again, is that agere sequitur esse: “Action follows being”—and since the demons exist in an order, they will act in an order. Satan was the highest of the angels who fell. Whether he was the highest of the angels simply speaking has always been up for debate, with St. Thomas saying probably, but with some Franciscan theologians especially preferring to have Satan as merely the highest of the cherubim so that they might exempt all the fiery loving seraphim from sin—but at the very least we can say that Satan was the loftiest relative to the rest who sinned with him. He sits at the head of their hierarchy, and so he will act at the head of their hierarchy.

He is even, in some way, the cause of the rest of their sin—not by compulsion, which would make their choice involuntary and thus not a choice at all, but by suggestion or exhortation. Recall St. John’s imagery of the dragon sweeping away a third of the stars with its tail—and thus one third as the traditional number of angels who fell: less than half, since sin is against their natural inclination and nature prevails most of the time—but still no meager sum, especially given what we have said already about the innumerable multitudes of separated substances. And all these hordes of demons look to Satan, their model and inspiration, as their master. As St. Peter says in his second epistle, “By whom one has been overcome, of him he is also a slave.” There is a kind of perverse Fourth Way principle here, with the devil as first in the genus of rebel angels, and so, by his example, the cause of the rest of the genus.

St. Augustine and St. Thomas go so far as to speak of the devil’s prelacy as a sick imitation of Christ’s own. Of course with Satan there is no effective ontological link to his demons (or to the damned among men)—he is not the cause of their being, nor does he share his life with them, the way Christ shares his very Sonship by grace. Satan’s is only a moral causality, an evil exemplarity. Still, there is a sort of asymmetrical parallelism between Christ and his Church, on the one hand, and Satan and the City of Evil, on the other. Jesus even refers to “the devil and his angels,” paralleling our Lord’s own good angels. The tradition calls this the corpus diaboli, in explicit comparison and contradistinction to the Mystical Body of Christ. We might think, for example, of the great tympanum of the Premonstratensian church of Conques—the carving of the Last Judgment above the portal of that perfect eleventh-century Romanesque Church, just a few hours’ drive from here in Occitania along the Camino de Santiago (or Chemin de Saint-Jacques), which probably showed up in your high school art history book. In the center of the scene is Christ as Judge, ruling over heaven and earth, but in the lower-right corner is Satan, towering over the underworld in a way that recalls—but pathetically—the majesty of Christ in heaven. Satan is crowned and seated on a throne, directing spirits and souls with his arms—but unlike Christ, with his heavenly halo and mandorla, gesturing in both directions so as to sift according to justice, Satan points only downward into his own fiery kingdom. Christ is robed in glory and attended by angel acolytes; Satan is naked and encircled by snakes. He is not a copy of Christ, but a caricature. All evil can do is ape the good.

Two important objections arise concerning Satan’s authority. First, if Satan is the greatest sinner among them, falling from the highest height and taking the rest down with him, then why is he rewarded by providence with getting to be their king? To this St. Thomas answers that being a leader in evil is “not unto the good of the [leader], but rather unto [his] evil, because since to do evil especially pertains to misery, to excel in evil is to be [even] more miserable.” And so, even if he cannot see it this way, Satan’s rule is really a punishment, greatly contributing to his unhappiness, now and especially at the end of the world.

The second objection is this: Why would any demon choose Satan as his leader rather than God? After all, since the demons’ principal characteristic is their pride, would they not prefer to be subject to one who is infinitely greater, since it seems that much more insulting to pride to have to serve one who is so inferior? As Fr. Bonino puts it, “It is far more humiliating for the proud to submit to a subordinate superior than to the supreme superior. It is more mortifying for the young parochial vicar to obey the petty commands of a dull pastor than to carry out orders received directly from the Holy Father!” St. Thomas responds as follows:

All else being equal, [it is true that] the proud would rather be subject to a superior than to an inferior. But if he should be able to obtain some excellence under an inferior, which he could not obtain from the superior, then he would rather choose to be subject to the inferior than to the superior. And therefore it was not against the pride of the demons that they chose to be subject to an inferior, consenting to his authority, willing to have him as their prince and leader precisely so that they might obtain their ultimate beatitude by [their own] natural power—especially because in the order of nature they were already subject to the supreme angel even then.

Thus, although Satan harbors the illusion that he is like God, an end for others, really the lower demons submit to him not for that reason, but only because they think that submitting to Satan will let each of them become the ultimate end for himself. They too want to be like God, totally self-sufficient. “Non serviam!” is not just the slogan of their rebellion against the old order, but it is also the animating political philosophy of their new order itself. They are not seeking together the common good of the City of Evil, but rather each one is seeking only the affirmation of his own excellence and interest. As far as the demons are concerned, theirs is merely a kingdom of convenience.

Now, you might think that such coordinated self-interest would not be a very strong basis for political unity. You would be right. There is no true concord in the infernal kingdom, for concordia means “a union of hearts,” and the anti-social principle of pride breeds only discord. As Fr. Bonino says, “Pride nurtures a constant preference for its own good to the disregard of the common good.” One thing that does help to unite the demons, however, is their common enemy. They forge a “social contract,” as it were, in order to wage war more effectively against God and man. Thus St. Thomas writes in the reply to an objection:

The concord of the demons, whereby some obey others, is not from any friendship that they have among themselves; but from their common wickedness, by which they hate men, and fight against the justice of God. For it is proper [also] to wicked men that they should join themselves to one another and be subject to those whom they perceive to be stronger, for carrying out each his own individual wickedness.

Among the demons, therefore, there is no mutual affection. There is no internal and moral concord based on civic friendship, but only an external and instrumental alliance. Again Fr. Bonino: “As we know, external politics is an excellent diversion when there are serious domestic political problems. Sacred union against the external enemy is a remedy against internal political divisions. Thus hatred against God and men brings the demons together, and leads them to moderate their hatred of each other.” Of course this is no true political common good, but only a collectively self-interested compact of the sort one might find among a band of thieves. Satan is not so much a monarch as a mob boss.

All of this is the story the demons tell themselves about why they tolerate Satan and one another. They believe that such political bonds are optional but ultimately advantageous. Each one thinks that this social contract will eventually help him to get what he wants for himself—namely to become his own principle of happiness, and to offend God by causing the damnation of men. As Fr. Bonino puts it, “The unity of the society of demons is founded, from the point of view of subjective intentions, on a convergence of misunderstood interests: a caricature of the common good.” But in fact there is a deeper, truer reason why the demons are united in a society: divine wisdom. St. Thomas quotes the book of Wisdom, which tells how this wisdom “reaches from end to end mightily, and disposes all things sweetly.” Such wisdom, Thomas says, “leaves nothing in the universe inordinate,” or without order. As Fr. Bonino writes, “This type of society is viable not so much in virtue of a very unstable balance of interests as in virtue of the permanence within it of a fundamentally good nature, which, although it may be thwarted or even denied, is nonetheless present and a source of what can be positive in the permanence of this society.” Thus the kingdom of hell is ultimately founded not upon the injustice of the demons, but upon the justice of God, ordering all things by nature and his providential care.

The third article of our Question 109 asks whether the demons can illumine each other. To understand the difficulty, remember the threefold act of the angelic hierarchy: purging, illumining, perfecting. Now, obviously the demons are not purging or perfecting their inferiors, purifying them or uniting them to God. But it is less clear with regard to the illuminative way, because the demons really can communicate with one another. They can and do share truths among themselves. However, the answer must be that such communication is not true illumination, for, explains St. Thomas, “Illumination properly is the manifestation of truth according as it is ordered to God, who illumines every intellect.” But the demons’ speech to one another is meant to lead rather away from God, and thus it ends in greater darkness, not illumination. Theirs is not a communion of minds in the truth they behold, unto its source in the First Truth. They are not contemplating and handing on the things contemplated. Instead they have only a practical aim: to transmit useful information to coordinate their actions more effectively, so that they might exclude men from the illumined divinization from which they have already definitively excluded themselves. “The intention from which this communication arises is always perverse,” Fr. Bonino says: “It is consummated by the evil designs of the devil who is always trying to divert others from God, whereas illumination is a communication of truth that comes from God and whose purpose is to lead to God.” Demonic speech, therefore, is not illuminative. It is not even speculative. It is a mere calculation of efficiency: “the primacy of the practical” taken to its most evil extreme.

Article 4, the last of our question, is about the relation between angels and demons. Granted the demons have a hierarchy of their own, how does it stand in regard to the graced angelic hierarchy of the celestial choirs? This is a consoling consideration: All authority comes from God, and so the closer anyone is to God, the more influence that one will have over others. As such, the good angels rule over the bad, because they are nearer to God, participating more fully in his royal majesty. This is just how the cosmic hierarchy plays itself out.

The angels’ authority over the demons is real even now, but it will become especially manifest on the last day, when St. Michael and the glorious armies of heaven march in full force, when the City of Evil is unequivocally defeated, and Satan and his subjects are banished to hell for eternity. We are living now in the last days, as indeed Christians have been ever since the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us—and the demons are not stupid. Deep down they suspect that their days are numbered, that the war will come to an end, and not in their favor—and the dread and anger of this realization makes them to act out with ever greater ferocity. “Woe to you, O earth and sea,” we read in Revelation: “because the devil is come down unto you, having great wrath, knowing that he hath but a short time”—after which he “shall be tormented day and night for ever and ever.” We are witnessing the death throes of the corpus diaboli upon the earth.

This final article, about the angels’ power over the demons, makes sense out of why this question on the society of hell is included in the section of the Prima Pars on divine governance, which might have stuck you as unusual when I first mentioned it. Not even the demons, in their rival city, escape the government of God. “If I descend into hell, thou art present,” chants the Psalmist. Of course the demons do not formally participate in the good of the whole creation, since their entire wills are fixed against it, but materially they cannot escape. All that they do, in their coordinated rebellion, is still ultimately directed by God through his angels. Thus any evil that the angels permit—whether from demons or from men—is always for the sake of some good that follows it. In St. Thomas’ phrase, the angels are “ministers of divine wisdom.” Moreover—and this should be especially comforting, and a nice place to conclude our consideration of the politics of hell—even the very lowest of the guardian angels, even yours or mine, can rule over Satan himself, because “the power of divine justice to which the good angels cleave is stronger than the natural power of the [demons].” Thank God.

I would like for us to return to our thought experiment from the very beginning, now—I hope—with a greater understanding of its implications. I had asked you to imagine a society—a society made up of self-absorbed, atomized individuals—a society in which the various members tolerate each other, because they know they need each other, but only so that each of them can achieve his own private ambitions and desires—a society, moreover, that is in open rebellion against its own origins. Then I asked you to imagine that, once upon a time, this society had been noble, and civil, and good—but that its citizens—especially its elite citizens—out of a disordered sense of pride, effected a revolution against that received ancient order. Next I had you imagine that this revolution had some ironic consequences, such as that, in the name of liberating themselves from being subject to any official king, these citizens wound up creating for themselves an even more oppressive and authoritarian regime—and that their honorable hierarchy, which in their pettiness they would have liked to dissolve altogether, was merely replaced by a dishonorable hierarchy—that they traded an ordered harmony for hostile power relations, and a common good for private vices. You further imagined that this populace—who, again, hate their own heritage and devote all their time and energy to contradicting it, loudly—is in fact deeply unsatisfied, frustrated, lonely, sad. And yet you imagined that, despite their unhappiness in this society, they also live in constant, ever-growing fear—fear that this society of theirs, and everything it stands for, is on the verge of defeat. You imagined, finally, that this hysterical anxiety of theirs makes them even more odious and offensive and obnoxious.

I used to think that St. Thomas Aquinas had never addressed liberalism in his political writings, living, as he did, several centuries before the Enlightenment. I was wrong. He treats it carefully and critically in the text we have just considered: Prima Pars Question 109, on the political arrangement of the demons. It is terrifying how similar St. Thomas’ account of the politics of hell is to Immanuel Kant’s account of the ideal government. Kant even refers to such a state as being perfect for “a population of demons,” secured with general laws for conserving their common accord, laws that pit particular sentiments against each other, so that they might procedurally neutralize the proud egoistic dispositions of each individual. “Kant is here at antipodes with the political thought of St. Thomas Aquinas,” remarks Fr. Bonino. As I expect everyone here will know well, St. Thomas teaches that society arises from the natural sociability of man expressed in civic friendship and ordered to his temporal common good, itself ordered to his spiritual common good attained in and through the Roman Church. It is the Catholic alternative to Kant’s Lutheran individualist state of nature, in—another Protestant’s catchphrase—a war of all against all.

It is the angelic alternative to Kant’s republican rule for a race of demons. For in St. Thomas’ Dionysian worldview, the angelic hierarchy is to serve as the archetype of our human societies, both political and ecclesiastical. James Madison was wrong, therefore, that “If men were angels, no government would be necessary.” As we have seen, the angels have an elaborate government, and theirs is meant to be the model for ours. But alas, too often of late, our states have taken the demons for their political inspiration instead, with our citizens driven only by a narcissistic search for their private interest, rejecting all reference to a common good of the moral order, beginning with the transcendent common good which is God himself. Granted, there are dissimilarities here as well: Unlike the angels, our societies are not founded upon essential inequalities, since all men share a single species; and unlike the demons, no human society is definitively fixed in its rejection of God. Nonetheless, the similarities are pronounced, and they are not accidental. Liberalism has traded a hierarchy unto God for an every-man-for-himself tyranny.

We will conclude with one final quotation from Fr. Serge-Thomas Bonino:

The demonic society offers us an interesting theoretical model, for thinking about the not-always-theoretical possibility of a society that either rejects or disregards any reference to the objective moral good, and merely ensures a more or less peaceful coexistence among individuals who are deemed evil and guided solely by the pursuit of self-interest. Reflection on the demonic city confirms our contemporary experience: Such a society is feasible! It survives by virtue of a certain “a-moral,” unjust, and precarious balance that is established between the subjective interests of each of the individuals involved. However, this society survives above all and most profoundly because the natural tendencies that lead each being toward the objective good of its own nature remain active in it, though disavowed and opposed on the reflective level.

In other words—what is old hat for us by now—liberalism survives by exploiting pre-liberal resources, the resources of the very metaphysical order and natural law that it speculatively denies.

By grace, St. Thomas teaches, we are to be taken up into the orders of the angels, perhaps filling out the places in the celestial hierarchy vacated through the fall. And so our politics should be practicing for that ascent, and indeed helping to accomplish it, by ordering us together toward our true good. Whereas liberalism prepares our souls to be slotted into the demonic order of hell, of which it is an alarmingly accurate imitation. May our better angels prevail.

Regina Angelorum, ora pro nobis.

Omnes angeli Dei, orate pro nobis.